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In 1794, Pennsylvania adopted a homicide law that other States from Maine to California
have imitated.1 The result is called the “Pennsylvania pattern.” It features two degrees of
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murder, first and second, both of which require proof of malice aforethought, and it typically is
supplemented by lesser included offenses of manslaughter or negligent homicide that vary with
the jurisdiction.2 The purpose of this Eighteenth-Century legislation was to limit the reach of
capital punishment, although this function no longer is needed.3 The thesis of this article is that
the Pennsylvania pattern produces poor crime definition, in spite of its surprising staying power,
even today, across the country. The most compelling examples of its deficiencies are probably
to be found in the homicide jurisprudence of California, and this article therefore concentrates
heavily on that State; but the concepts developed here apply to every jurisdiction that uses the
Pennsylvania formulation.
One factor that makes California a striking illustration of the Pennsylvania pattern’s
obsolescence is that the law of California usually innovates. It stays contemporary, or at least
this has always been my impression. California gave us the impetus for Tarasoff liability, and it
gave us strict legal controls on city planning.4 Voters in that State have acted forcefully to adopt
by-the-numbers tax limits, serious restrictions on affirmative action, and tighter treatment of
probationers.5 The results in some cases have proved less than felicitous,6 but it has always
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Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 17 Cal.3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976), imposes
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seemed to me that California has been willing to change its laws.
It is surprising, therefore, that the California law of homicide has remained as stodgy as it
has. The reason is that it still conforms to the old-time Pennsylvania pattern of 1794. It uses
antiquated definitions and gradations of homicide.7 Decisions that contradict contemporary
attitudes about the severity of murders remain in place, approved as authority, even though other
decisions seem to have overruled them sub silentio.8 In fact, California’s murder jurisprudence
has become so confused under the influence of the Pennsylvania pattern that one can only
wonder pessimistically at the impression made on jurors who conscientiously try to follow the
all-over-the-map instructions that result.9 The state legislature has changed a few doctrines
around the edges,10 but the problem lies deeper: in fundamental definitions of homicidal crimes
that, under the Pennsylvania pattern, are based on oxymoron, misnomer, metaphor, and
disproportion.
The reader should not get the impression that I favor California-bashing (or for that
matter, Pennsylvania-bashing), because I find many aspects of California law to admire.11 But to
put it bluntly, I think the Pennsylvania pattern is an anachronism, and by way of contrast, I find
6
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the homicide law of my State, Texas, preferable in virtually every respect in which it differs.
Texas revised its Penal Code in 1973 in a way that was heavily influenced by the Model Penal
Code,12 although it contains important departures from the MPC. The revision was not pain-free.
In fact, is was wrenching.13 But today, Texans are governed by murder laws that say what they
mean, reflect the people’s values, produce crime gradations roughly corresponding to
blameworthiness, and communicate the rules consistently to judges and jurors.14
It is not so with the Pennsylvania pattern.15 Admittedly, the doctrines that this article will
analyze are traditional.16 Some, in fact, come to us from time immemorial, with a patina of
venerable fondness attached to them.17 Tradition and experience can furnish sound reasons for
keeping the wisdom of the past. But imagine a Pennsylvanian traveling to work on the local
freeway in a horse and buggy, merely because that method of travel happens to be traditional.
Except perhaps in Amish territory, onlookers rightly would suggest that the traveler should
consider other alternatives. So it is here: clumsy crime definition should not control us merely
because it has been used for a long time.
12

See infra, e.g., Pt. ID of this Article.

13

The redefinition of virtually every offense led to a large number of wholesale reversals for reasons having nothing
to do with guilt. For example, in Day v. State, 532 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Crim. 1976), a burglary case, the trial court
did not instruct the jury on the offense of criminal trespass, which the Court of Criminal Appeals held was a lesser
included offense. The court’s holding was far from obvious, required an extensive opinion on rehearing, and
produced two separate dissents and a separate concurrence. Its effect, however, was widespread and can be inferred
to have resulted in reversal of every pending burglary case presenting the issue. Several cases held that indictments
that apparently were standard forms applicable to many cases were “fundamentally defective” because they did not
allege particulars of certain kinds, when the Penal Code did not call expressly for those particulars. E.g., Smith v.
State, 571 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. Crim. 1978) (ordering dismissal of indictment after conviction because indictment did
not include certain language of statute that could be assumed to exist under other language, even though jury was
properly instructed on all elements).
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This article begins with the most serious homicidal crime in the Pennsylvania pattern.
Specifically, it examines the statutory distinction between first-and second-degree murder, a
distinction that produces significant differences in the treatment of convicted murderers but that
is indeterminate, in many kinds of cases, almost to the point of meaninglessness.18 The article
then contrasts the Pennsylvania pattern, with an emphasis on its California embodiment, to the
Model Penal Code, as it is reflected in the Texas murder statute.19 Next, the article considers the
basic definition of murder under the Pennsylvania pattern, which is expressed in a double
misnomer and which makes the crime difficult to distinguish from lower degrees of homicide.
Again, the article compares the Pennsylvania pattern to the different MPC-Texas approach.
Later sections analyze the Pennsylvania-California and MPC-Texas treatments of voluntary
manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter, and felony murder.20 A final section contains the
author’s conclusions, which include the concern that the Pennsylvania pattern of homicide law
encourages both inappropriate acquittals and inappropriate convictions to a degree that could be
avoided by revised formulations.
Frankly, the scope of this article is ambitious, and maybe there is a danger that it is too
ambitious. Most articles on homicide tend to confine themselves—sensibly—to single
jurisdictions or to single concepts.21 But homicide law usually is defined in terms of multiple
levels of closely-related crimes, and an examination of one offense may not help to expose
overlaps, confusion, or gaps in overall coverage. And examination of a single jurisdiction may
prove less valuable than a comparison of different approaches. This article therefore undertakes
17

For example, the term “malice aforethought” evolved over several centuries. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
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a broader analysis. This is one reason for its emphasis on one Pennsylvania-pattern State
(California), and it also is the reason the article will not analyze every detail for most homicidal
crimes (particularly for the felony murder rule). Still, I hope to say something about the entire
Pennsylvania pattern, from top to bottom, that will be useful throughout the States that follow it,
and to suggest concrete solutions to most of the problems that my article will raise.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT: TWO STATUTORY PATTERNS,
DIFFERING BOTH IN CONCEPT AND IN ORIGIN
Because this article concentrates on two distinct patterns of homicide law, it may be best
to sketch them first. The California system follows the Pennsylvania pattern. It consists of (1)
first degree murder, (2) second degree murder, (3) voluntary manslaughter, and (4) lesser
manslaughters. Murder requires “malice aforethought”: a term of art that includes both
intentional and unintentional killings. First degree murder also requires premeditation and
deliberation, while second degree requires only malice. Voluntary manslaughter includes certain
passion killings, and involuntary manslaughter requires criminal negligence. Felony murder
suffices for either first-degree or second-degree, depending on the circumstances. This is a broad
brush depiction, and there are many issues underlying the terminology.
The Model Penal Code defines crimes of (1) murder, manslaughter (which may be either
(2) voluntary or (3) involuntary), and (4) criminally negligent homicide. There is only one degree
of murder, but it includes some unintended killings. The MPC abolishes malice and defines mens
rea precisely. The Texas law of homicide follows the core MPC definitions. There are, however,
some differences. For example, Texas defines a version of felony murder, whereas the MPC does
not. Texas also abolishes voluntary manslaughter; the offense remains murder, but under
specified circumstances, it is subject to a lesser maximum sentence. The effect is conceptually
21
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similar to retention of voluntary manslaughter, but with subtle differences. And there are further
changes from the MPC, although its thrust is preserved in Texas.
There is a fundamental difference, too, in how the California and Texas systems
developed. Although now embodied in statutes, the Pennsylvania pattern and the California
approach reflect their common law origins. Rather than embodying a single plan with grades
calibrated together like those of the MPC, the Pennsylvania-California structure evolved
gradually, beginning with one crime, unlawful homicide, then split into murder and
manslaughter, and then only much later divided murder into degrees. The difference in their
origins informs the discussion of the respective homicide schemes.
I.

THE PREMEDITATION-DELIBERATION FORMULA

The most serious offense in the Pennsylvania pattern is first-degree murder. This crime
is separated from second-degree murder by the premeditation-deliberation formula. Specifically,
first-degree murder generally requires a “deliberate” and “premeditated” killing.22 This is a
historical, traditional formulation, even though it is a creature of statute23 rather than common
law.

The difference between first- and second-degree murder is significant because in

California, for example, a first-degree conviction carries a minimum sentence of twenty-five
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See Cal. Penal Code § 189 (West 2005). See generally LAURIE L. LEVENSON & ALEX RICCIARDULLI,
CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW § 5:11-5:16 (2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter cited as LEVENSON et al.] (discussing
this kind of murder).
23

See LAFAVE § 14.7. It should be added that the more basic common law concept of malice may have
incorporated a kind of “premeditation” at its inception, but if so, it was different in both meaning and purpose. See
infra note 196.
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years and can subject the defendant to the death penalty24 or life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole.25

Second-degree murder, by way of contrast, carries a fifteen-year

minimum.26
There are other ways of committing first-degree murder. The California statute, again
influenced by Pennsylvania, also includes murder committed by “lying in wait,” “poisons,” and
certain other kinds of specific means.27 This article will consider these provisions later. They
are gap-fillers that indirectly prove the point that the premeditation-deliberation formula is
inadequate to cover the subject.28

Most first-degree cases, however, still depend upon

premeditation and deliberation.
Evidently, the policy underlying the Pennsylvania pattern is that a single factor
distinguishes the most serious murders: a mens rea that combines “premeditation” and
“deliberation.” One might argue that, in Pennsylvania, the intelligent planner—the kind of
genteel murderer one meets in an Agatha Christie novel—is the prototype for the worst of the
worst, although this argument is overly simplistic. The problem is, the line that Pennsylvania
draws between first- and second-degree murder is vague, indeterminate, and shifting.
produces arbitrary results.29

It

Furthermore, by adopting a mens rea of premeditation and

deliberation as the sole determinant of blameworthiness, the Pennsylvania pattern sometimes
gets it backward, punishing lesser crimes more severely and depreciating the seriousness of more
24

Capital punishment need not, however, be related to degrees of murder. It depends, instead, on specific factors
separate from the murder conviction itself. See infra note 141 and accompanying text. Thus, the persistence of the
Pennsylvania pattern is surprising in light of its initial purpose of restricting capital punishment, a purpose for which
it no longer is needed. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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Cal. Penal Code § 190 (West 2005).
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blameworthy offenses.30
It should be added that, by using this top-to-bottom approach and beginning with the
most serious homicidal crime, this article risks losing sight of the history of the Pennsylvania
pattern. In fact, murder existed long before first-degree murder was invented. Furthermore,
first-degree murder itself is an old idea. It dates from the Eighteenth Century, and the California
statute defining this crime was adopted more than a hundred years before the first of the cases
that this article will discuss.

But examining the offenses from top to bottom has an

organizational simplicity to it, and that is why this article uses this approach.
A. The Search for Meaning: Premeditation and Deliberation in People v. Anderson
The poster case for what is wrong with the premeditation-deliberation formula is the
California Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Anderson.31 Although Anderson was decided
during the 1960’s, and has undergone some amount of modification, it still is part of the law
today.32 The murder in Anderson was particularly brutal. Ironically, however, the very fact that
the killing was random, violent, and indiscriminate—factors that, one might think, would have
aggravated the crime—resulted in exonerating the defendant of first-degree murder. Thus begins
our strange journey: with a murder that was random, violent, and indiscriminate, which under the
Pennsylvania pattern, can become a factor in mitigation.33
1.

The Murder in Anderson

Anderson lived with a Mrs. Hammond, whose youngest daughter, Victoria, was ten years

30

Cf. notes 65-69 and accompanying text (comparing cases).

31

447 P.2d 942 (Cal. 1968) (en banc).
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See infra Pt. IB2 of this Article.
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See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
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old.34 On the morning of the murder, Mrs. Hammond left for work, leaving Victoria at home
with the defendant. Anderson was on his third day in a drinking binge.35 Mrs. Hammond’s son
Kenneth came home from school in the afternoon and heard sounds like boxes being moved and
someone cleaning up. He saw blood on the kitchen floor, and the defendant, dressed only in
slacks, falsely explained that he had cut himself.36 Mrs. Hammond returned, and the defendant
explained the blood by telling her that Kenneth had cut himself.37 When Kenneth denied it, the
defendant invented a third story: he told Mrs. Hammond that Victoria had cut herself but that the
cut was not serious. He further falsely explained that Victoria was at a friend’s for dinner.38
Kenneth had a “weird” feeling, and so he looked into Victoria’s room. He found her nude,
bloody body under some boxes and blankets on the floor and ran out of the room screaming that
Anderson had killed Victoria.39
The arresting officer found Anderson’s blood-spotted shorts on a chair in the living room
and defendant’s socks, with blood encrusted on the soles, in the master bedroom. The evidence
established that Victoria’s torn and bloodstained dress had been ripped from her and her clothes,
including her panties out of which the crotch had been torn, were found in various rooms of the
house. There were bloody footprints matching the size of the victim’s leading from the master
bedroom to Victoria’s room, and there was blood in almost every room, including the kitchen,
which appeared to have been mopped.40 Over sixty wounds were found on Victoria’s body. The
cuts extended all over her, including one from the rectum through the vagina, and including the
34

447 P.2d at 943-44.

35

Id. at 944-45.

36

Id.

37

Id. at 945.

38

Id.

39

Id. at 944.

40

Id. at 945.
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partial cutting off of her tongue. Some of the wounds, including the vaginal ones, were postmortem.41
The California Supreme Court defined the issue by saying, “We must, in the absence of
substantial evidence to support the verdict of first-degree murder, reduce the conviction to
second-degree murder.”42 The jury had convicted Anderson of first-degree murder and fixed the
penalty at death.43 Evidently, the jury concluded that infliction of sixty stab wounds on a tenyear-old child, during the course of activity that involved tearing off her clothes, tearing her
panties, and chasing her throughout the house while she bled profusely enough to leave
footprints from one room to the next and blood in nearly every part of the house, was sufficient
to show a deliberate and premeditated killing. But the California Supreme Court rejected the
jury’s seemingly straightforward reasoning and summarized the People’s case as follows:44
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment, the first
degree conviction must rest upon the following supporting proof: when Kenneth
arrived home from school he found the doors locked, and when the police officers
arrived to arrest defendant they found the shades in the front room down;
defendant apparently had attempted to clean up the bloodstained kitchen, and had
fabricated conflicting explanations of the blood that Kenneth noticed in the
kitchen, the blood that Victoria's mother observed in the living room, and
Victoria's absence on the evening of the killing; defendant had stabbed Victoria
repeatedly and had inflicted a post mortem rectal-vaginal wound; bloodstains
were found in several rooms of the house; Victoria's bloodstained and shredded
dress was found under her bed next to which her nude body was discovered under
a pile of boxes and blankets; Victoria's slip, with the straps torn off, was found
under the bed in the master bedroom; the crotch was ripped out of Victoria's
bloodsoaked panties; and the only bloodstained clothes of defendant's which were
discovered were his socks and his shorts, from which facts the People argue that
defendant was almost nude during the attack. . . .
The court acknowledged, “the legislative definition of the degrees of murder leaves much to the
41

Id.
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Id. at 946-47.
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Id. at 943.
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Id. at 947.
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discretion of the jury in many cases.” That discretion, however, “must have a sound factual basis
for its exercise.”45 Here, according to the Court, there was no “sound factual basis” for the jury’s
exercise of discretion to find Pennsylvania-style first-degree murder.46
2.

The “Anderson Factors”: Redefining Premeditation in Terms of
“‘Planning’ Activity,” “Motive,” and “Particular and Exacting” Means

The Anderson court began by identifying factors that it considered insufficient for firstdegree murder. It then identified three evidentiary characteristics that it found controlling.
Finally, it concluded that all of the required characteristics were absent. Each of these steps in
the court’s reasoning is subject to criticism.
(a) Factors That Are Not Enough, According to Anderson. The court considered it “well
established” that “the brutality of a killing cannot in itself support a finding [of] premeditation
and deliberation.” Furthermore, the court cited authority to the effect that “multiple acts of
violence on the victim” are insufficient to show “careful thought and weighing of
considerations.”47 Furthermore, an inexcusable and frenzied killing was less likely to qualify as
premeditated or deliberate, because it supported the inference that the killing resulted from a
“random,” “violent,” and “indiscriminate” attack, “rather than from deliberately placed wounds
inflicted according to a preconceived design.”48
The court recognized “the need to clarify the difference between the two degrees of
murder” and the bases upon which a reviewing court might find that “the evidence is sufficient”
for first-degree murder. Therefore, the court proposed to set forth “standards . . . for the kind of

45

Id.
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Id. at 947-48.
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Id. at 947.

48

Id. at 952.
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evidence which is sufficient to sustain a finding of premeditation and deliberation.”49 Part of the
court’s concern reflected a legitimate effort to conform faithfully to the legislative intent
expressed in the language of the statute. “[L]egislative classification of murder into two degrees
would be meaningless if ‘deliberation’ and ‘premeditation’ were construed as requiring no more
reflection than may be involved in the mere formation of a specific intent to kill.”50 Therefore,
the Anderson court saw a need to define premeditation and deliberation with narrow evidentiary
requirements.
(b) The Anderson Factors.

The court then set out three types of evidence that it

considered relevant to the premeditation-deliberation issue:51
The type of evidence which this court has found sufficient to sustain a finding
of premeditation and deliberation falls into three basic categories: (1) facts about
how and what defendant did prior to the actual killing which show that the
defendant was engaged in activity directed toward, and explicable as intended to
result in, the killing–what may be characterized as "planning" activity; (2) facts
about the defendant's prior relationship and/or conduct with the victim from
which the jury could reasonably infer a "motive" to kill the victim, which
inference of motive, together with facts of type (1) or (3), would in turn support
an inference that the killing was the result of "a pre-existing reflection" and
"careful thought and weighing of considerations" rather than "mere unconsidered
or rash impulse hastily executed"; (3) facts about the nature of the killing from
which the jury could infer that the manner of killing was so particular and
exacting that the defendant must have intentionally killed according to a
"preconceived design" to take his victim's life in a particular way for a "reason"
which the jury can reasonably infer from facts of type (1) or (2).
In summary, premeditation and deliberation could be made out by evidence of (1) “‘planning’
activity,” (2) “motive,” and (3) a “particular and exacting” “manner of killing” that evidenced a
“preconceived design.”
The court also provided standards about the weight to be given the three factors in

49

Id. at 948.

50

Id.

51

Id. at 949 (emphasis added). See generally LEVENSON § 5.12 (discussing Anderson).
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determining whether the evidence was sufficient to show premeditation and deliberation:52
Analysis of the cases will show that this court sustains verdicts of first degree
murder typically when there is evidence of all three types and otherwise requires
at least extremely strong evidence of (1) or evidence of (2) in conjunction with
either (1) or (3). . . .
In other words, the first factor, planning activity, seems to have emerged as paramount: the only
factor that could carry the day alone, if supported by “extremely strong evidence.” Motive could
suffice if combined with either “planning activity” or a “particular and exacting” manner of
killing, but the manner of killing alone, by implication, would be insufficient.
From there, it was downhill all the way as the court consigned the prosecution’s case to
meaninglessness. The court found no evidence of “any conduct by defendant prior to the killing
which would indicate that he was planning anything, felonious or otherwise.”53 The infliction of
sixty stab wounds, even when coupled with evidence that the defendant pursued ten-year-old
Victoria in such a manner as to leave blood in most every room, did not, according to this court,
show a design to kill. Also, in the court’s view, there was no evidence of “any behavior towards
Victoria from which the jury could reasonably infer that defendant had a ‘motive’ or desire to
sexually attack and/or kill her,”54 although the court did not tell us what other significance the
tearing of Victoria’s clothes and panties might have had when combined with Anderson’s own
state of undress. Finally, according to the court, the “manner of killing and the condition of the
body” could not support an inference of “deliberately placed wounds inflicted according a
preconceived design.”55 The court did not explain why sixty stab wounds, inflicted during the
bloody pursuit of a ten-year-old child whose panties and dress had been shredded, did not show a
52

Id.

53

Id. at 952.

54

Id.

55

Id.
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design to kill, although it did characterize these facts as “random,” “violent,” and
“indiscriminate.”
Therefore, Victoria’s killing was not first-degree murder. It was only second-degree,
punishable by a minimum of fifteen years. The jury’s evaluation of the crime as among the most
serious and blameworthy to be found among California offenses, and its decision to impose the
most severe available sentence, were not consistent with California jurisprudence.
B. Evaluating Anderson: Bad Judicial Reasoning? A Bad Statute? Both? Or Neither?
The holding in Anderson, understandably, has been the subject of criticism.56 Here, this
article will consider four possibilities for evaluating the decision. The first is that the court failed
to consider the evidence properly. The justices invented their own three-factor standard and
construed the evidence to fit their idiosyncratic preferences. In this view, the legislation is not
the problem; the problem is that the court usurped the function of the factfinder. The second
possibility, however, is that the statute is poorly conceived, and that the Anderson result is
defective because the Pennsylvania pattern furnishes a poor definition of its most severe crime.
According to this view, the California Supreme Court did what it had to do in its judicial role, by
faithfully carrying out the legislative command. And after all, the statute existed long before
Anderson. It presented the same kinds of interpretive difficulties before the court wrestled with
them in that case, and although the difficulties were the subject of pointed criticisms, the
legislature never acted. It left the court to clean up the mess. Third, it is possible that both of the

56

E.g., Matthew A. Pauley, Murder by Premeditation, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 145, 159-66 (1999); Bruce
Ledewitz, Mr. Carroll’s Mental State, or What Is Meant by Intent, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 71, 108-09 & n.163
(2001); Charles L. Hobson, Reforming California’s Homicide Law, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 495, 517-21 (1996).
It should be emphasized, however, that not all commentators fault the court for the holding, even when they
criticize the California jurisprudence. Cf. Suzanne E. Mounts, Premeditation and Deliberation in California:
Returning to a Distinction without a Difference, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 261 (2002) (arguing that the difficulty traces to
the term premeditation itself and that the court had to reach its holding because of this term). Whether there is
enough blame, to divide it between the legislature and the court, is the subject of this section of this article.
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above suggestions are accurate: the legislation is badly formulated, and the court mishandled the
evidence. This approach would conclude that the statute is clumsy, but still, it would have
authorized a first-degree murder conviction in Anderson if only the court had not mistreated the
evidence. Fourth and finally, one can opt for none of the above. One can decide, in other words,
that the result in Anderson is appropriate.
1. Did the Anderson Court Fail to Evaluate the Evidence Properly? (Did
Bad Judicial Reasoning Create the Result?)
Three justices dissented in Anderson. Justice Burke’s dissenting opinion disagreed with
the court’s evaluation of the evidence.

Specifically, Justice Burke would have upheld the

inference of a motive of sexual assault against Victoria:57
The jury could reasonably infer from the evidence adduced that the
underlying motive of the crime was sexual gratification: defendant chose a time
when he was alone in the house with the little girl; the window blinds were down
and the doors locked; he pursued the child throughout the house inflicting one
wound after another; he ripped out the crotch of her panties; he tore her remaining
clothes from her; he had removed his own clothes excepting his socks–there was
no other logical explanation for the absence of other bloody male clothing and he
took a shower immediately after the crime; furthermore, at one time during the
assault he had the child on the bed as evidenced by the large bloodstain found in
the center of the mattress; and, finally, a number of the wounds inflicted upon the
child could be considered sexual in nature, particularly the thrust of the knife into
her vagina, the cutting through to the anal canal and the numerous cuts and
contusions of her private parts and thighs. . . .
Furthermore, Justice Burke would have found sufficient evidence of premeditation, as he
explained in one brief but pointed sentence:58
. . . [T]here is credible evidence from which the jury could find a
premeditated homicide, e.g. the locking of the doors (whether before or after the
actual killing is a matter of conjecture), the duration of the assault, the pursuit
through many rooms with a quantity of blood being left in each room, the
extensive stabbings many of which would have sufficed as fatal, the removal of
57

Id. at 955. This reasoning also would have supported affirmance of the first-degree conviction on another ground,
namely, murder in the course of a felonious lewd act upon a child. See infra Pt. I(C) of this Article.

58

Id.
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the murder weapon from one room and the apparent repeated use of it in other
rooms. . . .
This reasoning would have resulted in affirmance of Anderson’s conviction.
Perhaps the difficulty in Anderson, then, is that the court substituted its own evaluation of
the evidence for that of the jury. The jury must decide the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, but a different standard applies in appellate courts. An appellate judge must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and then must affirm if any rational trier
of fact could have found proof beyond a reasonable doubt.59 The appellate standard of review is
a lenient one, favoring affirmance—so lenient that it may at first blush seem inconsistent with
the policy of the criminal law to protect the accused.

This apparent paradox disappears,

however, when one realizes that otherwise, jurors would become a nullity. The jury would be
reduced to the status of a group assembled to make a sort of “advisory verdict,” with the real
verdict to be supplied by the appellate court after its re-evaluation of the evidence. In fact, the
Anderson court recited that it was “[v]iewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
judgment.”60

A possible criticism of Anderson is that after articulating this standard, the

California Supreme Court simply lost its way and did not follow it.
Perhaps this arguable lack of deference to the jury was aggravated by the court’s creation
of the Anderson factors—the three factors of “planning activity,” “motive,” and “a particular and
exacting” manner of killing—factors that depart significantly from the statutory language, which
instead requires premeditation and deliberation. As Justice Hugo Black famously observed, “one
of the most effective ways of diluting or expanding a [legal principle] is to substitute for the
crucial word or words . . . another word or words, more or less flexible and more or less
59

See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
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447 P.2d at 947.
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restricted in meaning.” In this manner, he explained, a “broad, abstract and ambiguous concept”
can “easily be shrunken in meaning,” or it can also, on the other hand, be interpreted to govern
issues that it never was intended to.61 Thus, when the court transformed the statutory language
into three factors of its own independent creation and made “‘planning’ activity” assume
talismanic importance, it arguably did not “clarify” the legislative intent so much as it distorted
it. A defender of the opinion can argue, contrariwise, that the three factors are related to
premeditation, particularly “planning”; to this, the reader who sees an inappropriate redefinition
of the standard in the Anderson opinion can only say, yes, but these three narrow factors are not
all that can prove the state of mind encompassed in the idea of “premeditation”—and the dissent
did a better job, because it recognized this point.
For one thing, one can argue that the idea of “‘planning’ activity” is an oxymoron.
“Planning” is a mental function, whereas planning “activity” suggests the requirement of a
physical manifestation, something as concrete as a written diagram designed to facilitate an
assassination. The court could, instead, have defined premeditation in the sense of a clearly
evidenced design to kill (which could readily have been inferred in Anderson).62

Or, the

reference to planning “activity” might be read as calling for some type of circumstantial evidence
of planning, in the crime or in events before or after it, without focusing solely on the need for
specific “actions” that were themselves part of conduct that constituted “planning.”

For

example, this conception might include evidence that the crime required a long duration of
sustained activity.

What the court did, instead, however, was to reshape the issue into a

requirement of “planning activity”: a rule depending on physically manifested evidence that the

61

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 509 (1965) (dissenting opinion).
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The court elsewhere noted that premeditation and deliberation carry their “ordinary dictionary meanings.” 447
P.2d at 948.
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defendant undertook “activity,” distinctly preceding the crime itself. Thus, the majority was able
to deny the existence of premeditation by finding no evidence of planning in “defendant’s
actions prior to the killing.”63 By avoiding the trap into which the majority fell, relying as it did
so heavily upon convoluted phrases such as “planning activity,” Justice Burke was able to find
premeditation in such factors as “the duration of the assault, the pursuit through many rooms
with a quantity of blood being left in each room, the extensive stabbings many of which would
have sufficed as fatal, the removal of the murder weapon from one room, and the apparent
repeated use of it in other rooms.”64 This criticism of Anderson, then, would conclude that
Justice Burke’s reasoning was more faithful to the legislative concept of deliberation and
premeditation than the elaborate structure of factors that the majority created from inferences
outside the statute.
This theory—that the flaw in Anderson is the court’s evaluation of the evidence—is
reinforced by comparison of the Anderson opinion to those of other courts. For example,
Commonwealth v. Carroll65 is a decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court from about the
same time as Anderson, and it resulted in the affirmance of a first-degree murder conviction with
considerably less evidence of premeditation and deliberation than Anderson arguably presents.
Carroll shot his wife in the back of the head approximately five minutes after a heated argument.
There was significant evidence that “rage,” “desperation,” and “panic” had produced an
impulsive homicide, brought about by the defendant’s psychological dependence on his wife and
her nastily expressed refusal to support his career.66 Carroll’s own evidence showed that the
killing was an “automatic reflex,” as opposed to “an intentional premeditated type of
63

Id. at 952.

64

Id. at 955.

65

194 A.2d 911 (Pa. 1963).

19

homicide.”67

The court observed, however, that premeditation could arise instantaneously.

“Whether the intention to kill and the killing, that is, the premeditation and the fatal act, were
within a brief space of time or a long space of time is immaterial if the killing was in fact
intentional, willful, deliberate, and premeditated.”68 The court’s conclusion: “There is no doubt
that this was a willful, deliberate and premeditated murder.” One can easily argue that Carroll
and Anderson are backward, with Anderson falling into a more blameworthy category of
homicide while Carroll presents a lesser, although still serious, kind of offense—especially since
the court described Carroll as “terribly provoked” by his “belligerent and sadistic wife” at the
time of the killing.69 This consideration alone does not prove that the Anderson court was
wrong, of course; one can argue that the statute forced the court to do what it did, and that
Carroll is the decision that is wrong. Carroll does, however, point out a different pathway.
One also can argue that the Anderson court made several errors in logic and that they
cumulated so as to lead the court away from the legislative standard. In this view, the court
created evidentiary standards (the three factors) that did not correspond very closely to the
statute. It also improperly ignored other relevant concerns, such as the brutality and violence of
the killing, its duration, the multiple repetitions of the killing force, the nature of the wounds, the
many physical locations of the crime (in different rooms), the lethal nature of the implement, and
Anderson’s multiple cover-ups.70 Arguably, too, the court gave insufficient deference to the
66

Id. at 534-35.
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jury’s verdict, when its duty was to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict.
Finally, the court adopted reasoning that was unduly cramped when it denied the existence of
“any evidence” from which the jury could reasonably have inferred a sexual attack.
This is the blame-it-on-the-court argument. The trouble is, as we shall see next, the
legislature’s act in adopting the Pennsylvania pattern was the factor that precipitated the court’s
strange decision.
2. The Alternative Theory, That the Statutory Definition of First-Degree
Murder Is Flawed: Is Anderson the Legislature’s Fault?
There is another way to look at Anderson, one that is more favorable toward the court.
The legislature had defined first-degree murder, and the court faced the difficult job of applying
the muddled Pennsylvania standard. One might think that an intentional killing would qualify as
deliberate and premeditated, but the statutory scheme seemed to indicate that intent, by itself,
was sufficient only for murder, not for first-degree murder.71 Premeditation and deliberation
must mean something more, or so the argument would go. Furthermore, the three Anderson
factors had appeared in earlier cases, even if they had not reflected the rigid formula Anderson
seemed to infer from them.72 Thus, the court in Anderson might be viewed as having attempted
to make sense out of vague statutory language by using earlier interpretations, which is a proper
function of the judiciary.

In fact, the court forthrightly acknowledged that there were

“imperfections” and a “lack of conceptual consistency” in the Pennsylvania pattern but correctly

admissible to supply some evidence of it. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK,
EVIDENCE 162-63 (3d ed. 2003) (“courts generally admit evidence of behavior indicating consciousness of guilt”
to prove a “guilty mind.”) For a more persuasive treatment of post-crime evidence, see Hernandez v. State, 50 P.3d
1100, 1113 (Nev. 2002) (“. . . even if the knife was thrust into Donna’s vagina after her death, it is relevant evidence
of [defendant’s] state of mind before her death as he beat her, stabbed her repeatedly, and strangled her”). The
Anderson court should have considered the post-crime evidence in the same way.
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recognized a duty to “make practical application” of the law. Furthermore, these cases and other
authorities had repeatedly called upon the legislature to fix problems that were obvious from the
early days. So, what else was the court to do, in Anderson?73 A critic of the opinion could
readily conclude that this theory is not entirely persuasive, because the logic of the Anderson
opinion arguably remains flawed in several respects; these considerations do, however, raise the
question whether the problem with Anderson lies in the statutory language, rather than in the
court’s interpretation of it.
And there does indeed seem to be reason to fault the Pennsylvania pattern itself.
Specifically, defining first degree murder in a way that depends exclusively on premeditation and
deliberation raises two kinds of criticisms.

First, the premeditation-deliberation formula

dissolves into meaninglessness in some kinds of cases. This is why the California court in
Anderson referred to the legislation as creating jury “discretion” to find either first- or seconddegree murder. Second, by choosing mens rea as the sole determinant of the most serious grade
of murder, and a peculiarly defined mens rea at that, the legislation creates an artificial standard
that prevents crime grading from correlating with offense severity.
(a) Vagueness in the Premeditation-Deliberation Formula. At first blush, the concept of
“premeditation” does not seem excessively vague. But when it is combined with the concept that
premeditation can arise in an extremely brief time period, or in other words virtually at the
instant of the crime,74 the standard that it seems to impose disappears. “Premeditation” that
appears “instantaneously” is an oxymoron.75 The California court in Anderson seemed tacitly to
73
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recognize this problem by its insistence on the importance of “planning activity,” or actual
activity that occurs demonstrably beforehand. But Anderson leaves open the possibility that
premeditation can arise without prior planning activity.
The law must be conveyed to the jury, and the kind of confusion inherent in the coupling
of “premeditation” with an impulse arising instantaneously then will manifest itself in jury
instructions that do not guide the jury. Empirical studies tend to demonstrate that jurors
conscientiously attempt to follow the judge’s instructions.76 Lengthy deliberations in hard cases
may well come down to interpretation of words used in the court’s charge.77 And so, if there is
to be an instruction that is internally contradictory in a jury trial, let it not be in the basic
definition of the most serious criminal offense that the State has created.
The Anderson court avoided recognizing the problem of vagueness by characterizing it,
instead, as jury “discretion.”78 This euphemism papers over the defect, but it hardly solves the
problem. Unguided discretion is the opposite of law; it is lawlessness. As Kenneth Culp Davis
wrote in his landmark work, Discretionary Justice,

“The vast quantities of unnecessary

discretionary power that have grown up in our system should be cut back, and the discretionary
power that is found to be necessary should be properly confined, structured, and checked.”79
Otherwise, discretion manifests itself in arbitrary results, dissatisfied litigants, and lessened
respect for law. But it is particularly in the guidance of decisionmakers that discretion or
vagueness is a disadvantage. In a series of decisions, the United States Supreme Court has
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explained why.80 Citizens who attempt to comply with the law need reasonable specifics so they
can avoid unintentional commission of crimes. But as the Court has been clear in observing, the
more important reason for eliminating vagueness is to guide decisionmakers who must apply the
law.81 Obviously, these decisionmakers include juries. The kind of vagueness inherent in the
premeditation concept was not sufficient to create a constitutional violation, and the Anderson
court cannot be faulted for enforcing it; but the vagueness issue should have prompted the
legislature to reconsider the term.
In fact, the Anderson court’s invocation of “discretion” as an alternate term to vagueness
is an indication that the premeditation-deliberation formula is a non-standard. In this regard, the
definition of first-degree murder resembles the fallout from the ill-fated treatment of insanity in
Durham v. United States,82 which defined insanity as the “product” of a “mental disease or
defect.” Critics described this definition, too, as a “non-rule,”83 and undoubtedly it led to jury
“discretion” of a sort. The Durham test also resulted in blizzard of appellate opinions84 going in
different directions and sometimes featuring abrupt reversals.85 Finally, even the court that had
created the rule abandoned it.86 During its unhappy existence, the Durham rule “traveled a
remarkably circuitous path toward the conclusion that the jury needed some guidance, that words
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like ‘mental disease’ and ‘product’ were inadequate, and that the standard would have to
incorporate somehow a description of the sorts of effects . . . that were relevant to compliance
with the criminal law.”87 Even today, as Professor LaFave puts it, “[t]he eighteen years of
experience with Durham remain instructive on the fundamental question of how the insanity
defense should be defined”88—and, one might add, how all substantive criminal law doctrines
ought to be defined, including laws against murder.
When the Durham court overruled its own rule in United States v. Brawner,89 it
emphasized the importance of “uniformity.”90

In addition, it considered the effect of jury

“discretion” and determined that, instead of discretion concealed in indeterminate language,
jurors needed and deserved more specific guidance in the form of legal rules:91
. . . If the law provides no standard, members of the jury are placed in the
difficult position of having to find a [person] responsible for no other reason than
their personal feeling about [that individual]. . . . It is far easier for them to
perform the role assigned to them by legislature and courts if they know . . . that
their verdicts are "required" by law. . . .
There may be a tug of appeal in the suggestion that law is a means to justice
and the jury is an appropriate tribunal to ascertain justice. [But] [t]his is a
simplistic syllogism. . . . The thrust of a rule that in essence invites the jury to
ponder the evidence . . . , and then do what to them seems just, is to focus on what
seems "just" as to the particular individual. . . .
The court explained further, as follows:92
Still another aspect of justice is the requirement for rules of conduct that
establish reasonable generality, neutrality and constancy. . . . It is the sense of
justice propounded by those charged with making and declaring the law–
legislatures and courts–that lays down the rule . . . . It is one thing . . . to tolerate
87
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and even welcome the jury's sense of equity as a force that affects its application .
. . the legal rules that crystallize the requirements of justice as determined by the
lawmakers of the community. It is quite another to set the jury at large, without
such crystallization, to evolve its own legal rules and standards of justice. . . .
This “instructive experience,” as Professor LaFave describes it, should lead to extreme
skepticism about the viability of jury “discretion” of the kind that the Anderson court uncritically
accepted, or that the Pennsylvania pattern makes inevitable.
The non-standard contained in the premeditation-deliberation formula raises other
disadvantageous possibilities. Jurors may feel the need to obtain guidance from sources other
than the judge’s instructions. For example, the focus of the premeditation-deliberation formula
on poorly defined subjective mental states means that mental health experts, particularly
psychologists and psychiatrists, may become important witnesses.93 If these experts address the
issue directly, by opining on the question whether the defendant “did” or “did not” premeditate,
they may undermine the law-defining function of the court.94 Even if they testify in terms that
do not replicate the ultimate issue, these experts can accomplish the same result by substituting
synonyms for premeditation and deliberation. This state of affairs invites the prospect of a
cottage industry of partisan witnesses, paid to become advocates and to shove the legal standard,
rather than the facts, in one direction or the other. Alternatively, the jury may obtain guidance on
the meaning of premeditation from the adversary lawyers who present the case to them. Bad
crime definitions and indeterminate jury instructions mean that trial lawyers have more rhetorical
influence over jurors.95 Sometimes the prosecutor and defense lawyer, through balanced use of
93
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jury argument, can explain the confusing instructions so that jurors understand them better. But
if one attorney is skillful and the other not, an imbalance may result, and thus a confusing jury
charge makes outcomes depend significantly on the randomly distributed abilities of lawyers.96
This undesirable effect is to some degree inevitable, but it should be contained by jury
instructions that guide the jury, rather than by the exercise of lawmaking “discretion” by
individual jurors.
Finally, there is the ugly prospect that invisible and unguided “discretion” may mean a
result based on factors outside the law—or inconsistent with the law. A jury unable to apply the
court’s instructions may consider factors that no lawyer would recognize as relevant. A jury that
favors or disfavors a particular group or activity may consciously or unconsciously act upon its
prejudices.97 Specific definition of crimes may not eliminate these possibilities, but it probably
reduces them, whereas the Anderson court’s acceptance of discretion may have increased them.
(b) Crime Grading That Is Inconsistent With Blameworthiness. But vagueness is not the
only flaw in the Pennsylvania pattern. By focusing so heavily upon the single factor of mens rea,
and on one particular formulaic description of mens rea at that, the premeditation requirement for
first-degree murder produces poor crime grading. Highly blameworthy crimes may end up being
categorized merely as second-degree, while murders that arguably are less blameworthy may
come out as first-degree.98 The Anderson case is itself an example. While tacitly admitting that
the crime was particularly brutal, the court announced that “the brutality of a killing cannot in
itself support a finding that the killer acted with premeditation and deliberation.”99 In fact, the
96
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Anderson opinion seems to depreciate the seriousness of violent murders precisely because they
happen to be inexcusable, incomprehensible, and brutal.

The court made it clear that a

“random,” “violent,” and “indiscriminate” murder would not qualify as deliberate or
premeditated.100 In the topsy-turvy world of the Pennsylvania pattern, a defendant may be
rewarded by reduction in the grade of the offense if the defendant committed it in a thoughtless,
senseless, frenzied, and bizarre manner.
This issue is not new. The great legal historian James Fitzjames Stephen described the
arbitrariness produced by a premeditation standard in his landmark History of the Common Law
of England:101
As much cruelty, as much indifference to the life of others, a disposition at
least as dangerous to society, probably even more dangerous, is shown by sudden
as by premeditated murder . . . [Imagine that a man], passing along the road, sees
a boy sitting on a bridge over a deep river and, out of mere wanton barbarity,
pushes him into it and drowns him. A man makes advances to a girl who repels
him. He deliberately but instantly cuts her throat . . . In none of these cases is
there premeditation unless the word is used in a sense as unnatural as
“aforethought” in “malice aforethought,” but each represents even more diabolical
cruelty and ferocity than that which is involved in murders premeditated in the
natural sense of the word.
In other words, the premeditation-deliberation formula distorts crime grading by treating very
serious murders as less serious. The opposite also is true, because the premeditation-deliberation
formula treats less blameworthy crimes more seriously than more blameworthy ones. “One form
of premeditated killing, mercy killing, society may not view as particularly ‘blameworthy’.”102
Nevertheless, the Pennsylvania Pattern lumps these less blameworthy offenses together with the
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most serious crime in the Penal Code.
States that still use the Pennsylvania pattern should listen to Judge Stephen’s timehonored advice. Not only is the premeditation-deliberation formula vague; to the extent that it
embodies a standard at all, it creates results that are inconsistent with the policy of grading
homicides to reflect their relative blameworthiness. At its worst, it invites juries to act lawlessly
in voting their prejudices. There are better ways of defining murder, ways that this Article will
consider below.
3.

The Third Theory: Both the Legislation and the Anderson Opinion Are
Flawed

The third possibility is that the legislation and the Anderson opinion are both
misconceived.

In this view, the statute defines first-degree murder poorly by using the

premeditation-deliberation formula, but the California court could better have upheld Anderson’s
conviction by using a different interpretive approach, such as that of the dissent. As this article
has already noted, the Pennsylvania pattern has persisted for a long time, and as the article will
demonstrate later, the scholars who drafted the Model Penal Code squarely rejected it. As for the
Anderson opinion, the current interpretive regime, which this article will explore below, is far
more deferential in upholding jury verdicts. Today’s decisions probably would lend to an
affirmance of Anderson’s conviction, and although the current court has refrained from
overruling Anderson, it has pointedly expanded the kinds of evidence that can suffice for
premeditation and avoided the rigidity with which the earlier court seemed to apply its three
factors.
This conclusion, it is submitted, is probably the most persuasive of the four possibilities.
The court in Anderson lost its way. But perhaps more importantly, the legislature can (and
should) revise the statute, perhaps in ways more reflective of the Model Penal Code. This article
29

will return to this question in its conclusion.
4.

Defending the Premeditation-Deliberation Formula and the Anderson
Reasoning

In defense of the premeditation-deliberation formula, it can be said that this formulation
is traditional. It has been applied in the majority of American jurisdictions.103 For several
reasons, however, the pedigree of the premeditation-deliberation formula is not a persuasive
reason for retaining it. In the first place, it does not trace to the common law; the English judges
never divided murder into degrees. That development is the result of legislation, which should
be subject to change, just as all legislation is subject to change.104 Furthermore, the reasoning
underlying the premeditation-deliberation formula was to limit more severe punishments, usually
including the death penalty, to the most blameworthy crimes.105 Today, the death penalty is
limited primarily by other factors.106

For determining the lengths of prison sentences, the

premeditation-deliberation formula simply is too inaccurate to separate the most serious murders
from less serious ones, both because of its vagueness and because of its dependence upon a
single characteristic in a complex world that depends also on many other factors.107
Changing a rule as ingrained as the premeditation-deliberation formula will not be
without institutional costs.

There probably will be significant errors as legislation and

adjudication struggle over many years to process a new definition through all of its
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consequences.108 But if this kind of shakeup of the system were sufficient to preclude reasoned
change, physicians in California would cure infections today by bleeding patients rather than
using antibiotics. Tradition is not a sound reason for keeping the Pennsylvania pattern, and
neither is the cost of change.
Another defense of the premeditation-deliberation formula might be founded on the
argument that mens rea assertedly is the most reliable indicator (or to some, perhaps, the only
indicator) of blameworthiness.109 This argument has been offered in other areas, particularly in
opposition to the felony-murder rule110 and to victim impact evidence.111 Opponents of these
doctrines often advance their concepts of blameworthiness as a reason for eliminating all other
considerations than mens rea.112 The argument is unpersuasive for several reasons. In the first
place, the premeditation-deliberation formula does not focus on the range of blameworthy mental
states; it focuses only on one vague but narrowly defined mental state. To the extent that it has
meaning, it produces the dubious result of preferring senseless, brutal, and bizarre murders for
lenient treatment, precisely because they are senseless, brutal, and bizarre.113 This is a strange
approach to blameworthiness.
Furthermore, an exclusive focus upon mens rea is a dubious way to distinguish or grade
blameworthiness. Components of the actus reus, including the act itself, the circumstances, and
the result, also figure into the calculus of blameworthiness. They always have, from the early
108
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days of the common law. The debate over the felony-murder rule and over the admissibility of
victim impact evidence proves this point. Although attacks on the felony-murder rule usually
include conclusionary statements that the rule separates guilt from blameworthiness by
eliminating intent requirements,114 advocates of this argument do not explain why actus reus is
not also an ingredient of blameworthiness. Nearly all jurisdictions have retained the felonymurder rule, and close examination shows that a sole focus upon mens rea does not produce
results congruent with grades of blameworthiness:115
Differences in result must be taken into account as part of actus reus if
classification and grading are to be rational. For example, murder and attempted
murder may require similar mental states (indeed, attempted murder generally
requires proof of a higher mental element), but no common law jurisdiction treats
the two offenses as one, and certainly none treats attempted murder more
severely. The only difference justifying this classification is that death results in
one offense but not in the other. Similarly, it is a misdemeanor for a person to
operate a motor vehicle while impaired by drugs or alcohol, but if this conduct
causes the death of a human being, the offense in some jurisdictions is elevated to
the status of homicide. Most jurisdictions treat vehicular homicide more severely
than the misdemeanor of alcohol-impaired driving, even though the actions and
mental states of the defendant may be equivalent or identical.
These classifications are the result of a concern for grading offenses so as
to reflect societal notions of proportionality. . . .
The felony murder doctrine serves this goal, just as do the distinctions
inherent in the separate offenses of attempted murder and murder, or impaired
driving and vehicular homicide. Felony murder reflects a societal judgment that
an intentionally committed robbery that causes the death of a human being is
qualitatively more serious than an identical robbery that does not. . . .
Another misguided attempt to reduce all crime grading to mens rea has concerned victim impact
evidence. The Supreme Court initially outlawed this kind of evidence in capital cases, reasoning

113

See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.

114

See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.

115

David Crump and Susan Waite Crump, In Defense of the Felony Murder Doctrine, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 359, § I(A) (1985).

32

that the defendant’s intent was the only legitimate component of blameworthiness.116
Ultimately, however, the court reversed itself and held that circumstances and results, as well as
intent, were proper ingredients in the grading of a crime:117
. . . [T]he assessment of harm caused by the defendant as a result of the crime
charged has understandably been an important concern of the criminal law, both
in determining the elements of the offense and in determining the appropriate
punishment. Thus, two equally blameworthy criminal defendants may be guilty of
different offenses solely because their acts cause differing amounts of harm. “If a
bank robber aims his gun at a guard, pulls the trigger, and kills his target, he may
be put to death. If the gun unexpectedly misfires, he may not. His moral guilt in
both cases is identical, but his responsibility in the former is greater.”
Similarly, the actus reus components of act, circumstances, and result, rather than a focus only
on one type of mens rea, should be proper considerations in grading the severity of murders.
More to the point, the fact that a murder is particularly brutal, inexcusable, and bizarre should be
a factor in aggravation, not in mitigation. Thus, the argument for basing the definition of firstdegree murder exclusively on mens rea divorced from context, in the manner of the
premeditation-deliberation formula under the Pennsylvania pattern, is ultimately unpersuasive.
C. Beyond People v. Anderson: The Perez and Combs Cases
1.

Modifications after Anderson: Are There Any? If So, What?

Anderson is not the end of it, of course. There have been more recent decisions. Those
decisions suggest that the California court has modified Anderson, but the problem is, they do
not tell the reader how much of Anderson is left, nor do they articulate any new standard.118 A
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possible reading of the decisions is that Anderson has been overruled sub silentio, but since the
decisions continue to rely on Anderson with ostensible approval and some of them use its factors
as though they were determinative,119 the law in California is unclear. And if Anderson is indeed
gone, it is arguable that there is nothing to take its place.

It also is possible, as some

commentators have suggested, that the Anderson factors are now merely nonbinding guidelines
and that premeditation and deliberation are to be read in their ordinary senses, or as symbols for
little more than the requirement of a “purposeful” killing. In other words, they mean no more
than “intent,” in spite of the resulting effect on the distinction between first- and second-degree
murder.120 If this is so, it arguably makes little difference to retain the Anderson factors.
People v. Perez is a typical post-Anderson decision.121 It bears a striking resemblance to
Anderson factually, but the result is different, because the Perez court upheld the defendant’s
first-degree murder conviction. The deceased was a pregnant woman who, ironically, had the
same name as the victim in Anderson: Victoria.122 The defendant was an acquaintance who
killed her with multiple stab wounds inflicted with two weapons, including a steak knife. The
steak knife had broken, and there was evidence of blood in the kitchen, including blood in the
knife drawer. The defendant had parked his car on the street and entered the house, possibly
surreptitiously.123 The court of appeals, following Anderson, reversed the first-degree
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conviction.124 The California Supreme Court reversed the reversal and reinstated the judgment.
One might think that, to reach this result, the court would have to overrule Anderson.
Unfortunately, it did not. Instead, it read Anderson more narrowly than its reasoning would seem
to justify. Specifically, the court’s interpretation of Anderson was that the three factors were
neither required nor exclusive. This reading enabled the court to accuse the court of appeals of
assuming the role of the jury, even though that is exactly what the Anderson court had effectively
done,125 and what it arguably had mandated lower courts to do:126
In identifying categories of evidence bearing on premeditation and
deliberation, Anderson did not purport to establish an exhaustive list that would
exclude all other types and combinations of evidence that could support a finding
of premeditation and deliberation. . . . [I]t was attempting to do no more than
catalog common factors that had occurred in prior cases. The Anderson factors,
while helpful for purposes of review, are not a sine qua non to finding first degree
premeditated murder, nor are they exclusive.
Given this reasoning, one might have expected the Perez court to articulate a new approach, one
that would treat the Anderson factors neither as a “sine qua non” nor as “exclusive.” One might
have expected, in other words, a review of the evidence that did not concentrate on the three
Anderson factors and that considered other kinds of evidence; in fact, one might have anticipated
a new standard. But what the court did, after saying that the three factors were neither exclusive
nor necessary, was to use those very three factors as if they were exclusive and necessary:127
Evidence of planning activity is shown by the fact that defendant did not park
his car in the victim's driveway, he surreptitiously entered the house, and he
obtained a knife from the kitchen. As to motive, . . . it is reasonable to infer that
defendant determined it was necessary to kill Victoria to prevent her from
identifying him. . . . The manner of killing is also indicative of premeditation and
124
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deliberation. The evidence of blood in the kitchen knife drawer supports an
inference that defendant went to the kitchen in search of another knife after the
steak knife broke. This action bears similarity to reloading a gun . . . .
And so, is Anderson good law after Perez? Yes and no. Does Perez inaugurate a new approach?
Yes and no. If it does create a new standard, what is it? No one can know from the opinion.
The California court has continued this muddled approach in later decisions. In People v.
Combs,128 for example, the court again cited Anderson in reviewing a judgment of first-degree
murder. Its first step was to recite the three Anderson factors. It then observed that the factors
were neither necessary nor exclusive. But after doing so, the court again concentrated on the
Anderson factors as though they were necessary and exclusive, using them as the organizing
principle around which it reviewed all of the evidence.129 The facts in Combs were, as the court
stated, overwhelmingly supportive of the jury’s premeditation-deliberation finding, and maybe
the court cannot be faulted for failing to reach beyond the three factors to explain its affirmance.
Combs demonstrates, however, that the Anderson factors still tend to control outcomes even if
they have been watered down as requirements, and that there is no other identifiable standard for
measuring premeditation and deliberation.
2.

Possible Interpretations of the Premeditation-Deliberation Formula
Today

One possible way to read these decisions is to conclude that Anderson has been
overruled. That interpretation depends upon broad inferences, however, and those inferences are
weakened by the California court’s repeated citation of the decision with apparent approval.130
The theory that Anderson is gone is also undermined by the court’s later reliance on the
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Anderson factors as ostensibly necessary and exclusive, even though the court denies that they
are. The Perez court went out of its way to harmonize its holding with Anderson by asserting,
against the apparent tenor of the earlier decision, that Anderson did not make the three factors
controlling, but merely mentioned them because they were shown by parts of the evidence in
earlier decisions.131
If Anderson has been overruled, furthermore, it is difficult to say what has taken its place.
It may be that the court means to return to the general statutory language of premeditation and
deliberation and to weigh the evidence against those terms directly. This interpretation would
uphold jury findings in a way that would seem more in keeping with the legislative intent than
the manner of review inaugurated by Anderson.132 Evidence that Anderson summarily and
dubiously rejected could then become relevant, such as the violence of the crime, repetition of
the method of killing, duration of the offense, physical breadth of locations in which it takes
place, or efforts at concealment afterward.133 Specifically, unusual violence may provide
evidence of effort, which may help to develop the planning factor. Repetition may indicate
conscious choice, as in the examples of reloading a gun or replacing a broken knife. Duration of
the offense is indicative of sustained effort over a period of time, making a deliberate plan to kill
evident at some point, and arguably, so is pursuit of the effort to kill through multiple places
such as the many bloody rooms in Anderson. Concealment efforts, although they cannot alone
prove planning, may provide at least some evidence of planning, particularly if they are elaborate
or if they must have taken prior thought. The trouble is, many of the more recent decisions do
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not seem to take this approach of broadening the scope of cognizable evidence, since they rely
exclusively upon the three Anderson factors.134
It is even possible, if push were to come to shove, that the court might announce that all
that is meant by premeditation and deliberation is intent: just plain, old intent. Some
jurisdictions, in fact, have adopted precisely this approach; they have compressed premeditation
and deliberation into the lesser-included concept of intent.135 This interpretation has the
advantages of simplicity, of creating greater congruence between the judicial concept of
premeditation and deliberation and that of the jury (since intent is a term for which the common
understanding is closer to its judicial interpretation), and, arguably, of better conformity of
homicide verdicts to meaningful gradations of blameworthiness. At the same time, however,
interpreting premeditation and deliberation as intent, and nothing more, can be opposed on the
ground that it fails to give faithful meaning to the text written by the legislature.136 All three
words appear in homicide statutes conforming to the Pennsylvania pattern. In California, “intent”
is used as the express term for defining malice aforethought, which is the requirement for all
murder, including second degree murder, and first-degree murder is an aggravated form of the
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crime.137 The statutory texts seem to indicate, or at least they leave open the possibility, that an
intentional murder could occur without premeditation and deliberation.138 On the other hand, this
interpretation is not unavoidable; it is logically possible to interpret the text of the legislation (if
not the judicial decisions) to allow malice to be found from intent or otherwise, but to hold that
only first-degree murders exhibit intent.139 The statutory language dates from a century and a
half ago,140 and it was written under conditions in which it had the very different function of
confining capital punishment.141 Making sense out of first-degree murder under the Pennsylvania
pattern may require the court to cut the Gordian knot, with the question being: in what manner
are we to reconcile the conflicting possible interpretations?, because of the muddled state of
affairs in which the premeditation-deliberation formula is to be found today. If so, following the
lead of other jurisdictions and declaring that premeditation and deliberation mean, simply, intent,
would have a variety of advantages.
Or, Anderson may still be good law. It may be weakened but unbroken. Perez may mean
that the Anderson factors are still predominant, but that a reviewing court is to handle them in a
way that defers to the jury more than the Anderson court did. As one commentator, Julie Engels,
persuasively puts it, the Anderson factors have become “guidelines, not rules.” The courts use
the factors merely “to aid in the premeditation analysis,” and they do so “more leniently” than
Anderson’s “strict” restraints would require. This looser approach allows affirmance of a first
137
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degree conviction without any particular pattern of the three factors; indeed, it may allow
affirmance even if none is present. Thus, even “[a] senseless, random, but premeditated killing
supports first degree murder.”142 This interpretation is consistent with the holding in Perez,
which is the most significant decision interpreting Anderson. It would mean a reversal of the
result in Anderson, and it too would go a long way toward rationalizing the results in first-degree
murder cases.
One possible criticism of this approach is that it undermines the requirements of
premeditation and deliberation that are controlling under the Pennsylvania pattern. In reality,
“intent” may wind up supplying these ingredients. Thus, as Engels also observes, “The result is
that premeditation has taken on less and less meaning, becoming more synonymous with a
purpose to kill.”143 This result may not be undesirable, and it arguably is as faithful to the
legislative language as Anderson’s rigid interpretation.144 No matter what it does to interpret the
premeditation-deliberation formula, a court will encounter a degree of irrationality and
inconsistency requiring it to cut the Gordian knot. Anderson did so by inventing criteria that do
not fit the language. Interpreting premeditation as “purpose” or “intent” is no worse a way to cut
the knot, and arguably it is better.
But even if Anderson is (or has been) overruled or made more lenient, the problem
remains: the premeditation-deliberation formula is still the statutory standard that distinguishes
first-degree murder. These terms must be included in the trial court’s instructions to the jury, and
usually, they will be defined for the jury. Their ambiguities, inconsistencies, omissions, and
142
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irrational results will lurk in the background to influence the meaning of whatever definition of
these terms is given to the jury.
Thus, Pattern Jury Instructions in California, today, include the following explanations:145
CALJIC 8.20. Deliberate And Premeditated Murder
. . . The word "deliberate" means formed or arrived at or determined upon as
a result of careful thought and weighing of considerations for and against the
proposed course of action.
The word "premeditated" means considered beforehand.
If you find that the killing was preceded and accompanied by a clear,
deliberate intent on the part of the defendant to kill, which was the result of
deliberation and premeditation, so that it must have been formed upon preexisting reflection and not under a sudden heat of passion or other condition
precluding the idea of deliberation, it is murder of the first degree.
The law does not undertake to measure in units of time the length of the
period during which the thought must be pondered before it can ripen into an
intent to kill which is truly deliberate and premeditated. The time will vary with
different individuals and under varying circumstances.
The true test is not the duration of time, but rather the extent of the reflection.
A cold, calculated judgment and decision may be arrived at in a short period of
time, but a mere unconsidered and rash impulse, even though it includes an intent
to kill, is not deliberation and premeditation as will fix an unlawful killing as
murder of the first degree.
To constitute a deliberate and premeditated killing, the slayer must weigh and
consider the question of killing and the reasons for and against such a choice and,
having in mind the consequences, [he] [she] decides to and does kill.
These instructions imply by their emphasis that no time is required, or in other words that
“instantaneous premeditation” is possible, even though that notion seems internally inconsistent.
They do not say so, however, and thus they remain ambiguous. The instructions do not tell the
jury that a “senseless, random” murder can be first degree, either, although the California
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decisional law says so;146 instead, they are capable of being understood as excluding first-degree
murder for a senseless and random killing. In fact, the Anderson court’s reasoning reached
exactly this odd conclusion. These pattern instructions do not even include the Anderson factors,
although a reviewing court is quite likely to use those factors to evaluate the verdict, and thus,
the jury is not told about the law that will uphold or reverse what the jury does. Finally,
premeditation and deliberation are not comprehensibly distinguished from intent, and the
paragraph that ends by authorizing first-degree murder for someone who “decides” to kill makes
them appear synonymous with intent. This dizzying array of submerged issues guarantees that
the jury will act with a wide range of unguided “discretion,” which is to say, lawlessly.147 Cases
that ought to be first-degree will result in second-degree verdicts, and cases that ought to be
second-degree will result in first-degree verdicts, with the distinctions based on nothing more
than confusion. Similar cases will result in disparate verdicts. And the jury is free to vote on the
basis of extra-legal considerations, including invidious ones, because of the concept of
discretion.
Furthermore, imprecision about what has happened to Anderson will continue to confuse
appellate counsel—and the courts. Appellate lawyers must feel forced to argue insufficiency of
the evidence in many first-degree murder cases even if there is evidence galore, if only to avoid
later claims that they were ineffective. These sufficiency claims are less likely to have merit
after Perez; still, because Anderson remains, they must be asserted. They necessarily will elbow
out full briefing of other appellate issues.

And they will consume scarce criminal justice
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resources wastefully. In fact, a Westlaw search using the terms “premeditation,” “deliberation,”
and “People v. Anderson” disclosed 505 appellate cases in California,148 of which hundreds are
unreported, particularly among more recent cases. Unreported cases suggest unmeritorious
issues. But the most unfortunate aspect of this problem is that appellate counsel’s endeavor to
attack sufficiency on premeditation-deliberation grounds often will not be related to values that
matter. If an affirmance or reversal results on this ground, there is no reason to believe that it
will correlate with offense severity, since the premeditation-deliberation formula itself does
not.149
In California, the Pennsylvania pattern thus has created a climate in which millions of
dollars’ worth of scarce criminal justice resources are spent on nothing of value, when they could
be spent on victim compensation, better policing, improved prison conditions, or for that matter,
litigation and appeals of issues that do matter. And this criticism must be applicable, at least to
some degree, in every jurisdiction that follows the premeditation-deliberation formula. The
disadvantages of the premeditation-deliberation formula—its vagueness and tendency to produce
results inconsistent with blameworthiness—are serious.
D. Situation-Specific First-Degree Murder: “Lying in Wait” and Other Gap-Fillers
The Pennsylvania pattern in most States does not rely exclusively on premeditation and
deliberation to define first-degree murder, although these are the most frequent criteria. Firstdegree murder in California, for example, also includes murder perpetrated by means of
“explosive, knowing use of ammunition designed primarily to penetrate metal or armor, poison,
lying in wait, torture, . . . arson, rape, carjacking, robbery, burglary, mayhem, kidnapping, train
148
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wrecking, or any act punishable under [certain other statutes], or . . . discharging a firearm from a
motor vehicle, intentionally at another person with the intent to inflict death.”150 Some of these
criteria (such as lying in wait) are traditional,151 but most of the statute reads as though the
legislature acted episodically in response to the newspaper headlines of the day—covering “train
wrecking” murders and armor-piercing bullets as rare examples of recent egregious homicides
that otherwise were not covered as first-degree murders—instead of fixing the fundamental
problems in the statute.
These specific-instance definitions of first-degree murder raise the same problems of
proof, ambiguity, and inconsistency with blameworthiness that

are inherent in the

premeditation-deliberation formula. “Lying in wait,” for example, seems fairly specific at first
blush, but in concrete cases, it can be extraordinarily difficult to apply, and the courts have found
it necessary to produce a complex, multi-factor test for the meaning of “lying in wait.”152 What
is more, the phrase means different things in different cases,153 although the courts easily confuse
this point.154 In fact, Anderson and Perez, in their respective murders, probably “lay in wait,”
since this kind of murder in California mainly seems to require a surprise attack, and it “does not
require that the victim come to the murderer.” Thus, in California (as opposed to some other
jurisdictions), the murderer does not have to “wait” to “lie in wait.”155 The Anderson case shows
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another kind of ambiguity by raising the issue whether Anderson killed while committing the
felony of lewd acts upon a child in violation of California Penal Code § 288.156

This

circumstance also suffices to elevate the murder to first degree.157 The Anderson majority held
the evidence insufficient to raise “any” inference of a sexual motive,158 prompting the question
whether there could ever be such a case, given the powerful evidence there of precisely that
motive. The dissent briefly but persuasively details the argument to the contrary.159
These specific-means definitions of first-degree murder exhibit the flaw of disparity just
as the premeditation-deliberation formula does: a disconnect from blameworthiness. Given that
the essential factor for “lying in wait” in California seems to be surprise,160 and given that many
if not most murder victims presumably are surprised by their killers’ use of deadly force, it is
easy to see how inconsistent outcomes can result. A person subjected to surprise automatically
becomes the victim of a first-degree murder, provided, that

is, that the jury exercises its

“discretion” accordingly; but if the victim expects to be killed and is not surprised, this kind of
special-means murder does not apply, and the killing may be reduced to a lesser degree, even
though there is no basis in proportional crime grading for this difference. In fact, the whole idea
of separately defining lying-in-wait murders would seem unnecessary if only the words of the
statute meant what they said, because it would appear that a killer who lies in wait, intending to
both Anderson and Perez would allow inferences of lying in wait, and a premeditation analysis would become
unnecessary. In fact, the reasoning in Gurule would appear to support first-degree murder in any case except one in
which the victim approached the killer while knowing of the killer’s plan to kill that very victim. See also
LEVENSON § 5:15 (discussing complexities of “lying in wait”).
But some jurisdictions require a “watching and waiting in a concealed position.” See LAFAVE 771, citing United
States v. Shaw, 701 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1983).
156
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commit murder, acts with premeditation and deliberation anyway.
In the end, these specific-means definitions of first degree murder probably plug a few
loopholes, but they do so at the expense of creating new ambiguities, inconsistencies, and
disparities. They serve mainly to demonstrate the inadequacy of the Pennsylvania pattern. Isn’t
there a better way?
E. The Model Penal Code Approach: One Degree of Murder
1.

A Single Degree of Murder, Committed in One of Three Ways

My State, Texas, differs sharply from the Pennsylvania pattern (and from California) in
its definition of murder. At one time, Texas did have two degrees of murder,161 but our
legislature was persuaded by the drafters of the Model Penal Code162 to adopt a single degree.
The offense can be committed in any one of three ways:163
first, by “. . . intentionally or knowingly” causing the death of an individual.
This type of murder in Texas is a verbatim adoption of the Model Penal Code
formula, except that the word “intentionally” is substituted for the word
“purposefully” in the MPC. “Intentionally” is defined precisely, following the
MPC, and so is “knowingly.”
second, by “. . . intending to cause serious bodily injury” while committing “an
act clearly dangerous to human life” that causes the death of an individual.
This Texas definition of murder resembles common law murder based on a
serious assault, except that it goes beyond requiring the mental state of intent to
commit the assault by adding an objective actus reus component: an “act clearly
dangerous to human life.” This component confines the application of this
provision.
third, by committing a defined version of felony murder. This kind of murder also
differs sharply in Texas from other definitions, which is discussed and critiqued in
a later section of this article.
161

The two degrees were “murder with malice” and (counterintuitively) “murder without malice” (emphasis added).
See generally Mims v. State, 3 S.W.3d 923, 925-26 (Tex. Crim. 1999) (detailing the statutory history and citing the
statute as Tex. Penal Code art. 1257 (1931)).
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American Law Institute, Model Penal Code § 210.1 (1962).
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Tex. Penal Code § 19.02 (b) (Vernon 2005) (emphasis added).
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Jurors in Texas thus are not given confusing, internally inconsistent instructions. In the simplest
kinds of cases, they are required to decide, beyond a reasonable doubt, whether the killing was
“intentionally” or “knowingly” committed.164
This inquiry, under the Model Penal Code, is clear and relatively unambiguous, and it
probably can be applied by jurors with a facility close to that of judges. A definition of “intent”
and of “knowledge” is provided.165 In close cases, these definitions probably are helpful, but the
key advantage of the terminology is that the technical definitions do not vary sharply from the
ordinary understanding.166 The use of a single degree of murder avoids reliance on any one
particular factor in grading the seriousness of murders. The blameworthiness of the crime is
taken into account at sentencing.167 At that stage, aggravating factors such as those present in the
Anderson case can be taken into account, so that the violence, duration, and inexcusable nature
of a murder like that one can be reflected in a more severe sentence. At the same time, the
sentence for a intentional murder such as that in the Carroll case, above, where the defendant
killed under circumstances of provocation, can reflect fully the mitigating factors that were
present there, without the automatic enhancement of the minimum sentence, by a vague
premeditation-deliberation formula, that would result in Pennsylvania or California.
At the same time, imagine a defendant whose intent was to inflict injury just short of
death, but the defendant is in the unsympathetic position of saying, “I guess I went too far, and I
killed the victim. Gee, I’m sorry.” California might well treat this act as less than murder or, at
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Tex. Penal Code § 19.02 (b)(1) (Vernon 2005).
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Tex. Penal Code § 6.03 (Vernon 2005).
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Intent exists when the result is the actor’s “conscious objective or desire.” Knowledge exists when the actor is
“reasonably certain” that the actor’s conduct will cause the result. Id. These provisions are derived from § 2.02 of
the Model Penal Code.
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The statute defines murder as a first-degree felony, and thus it carries a penalty imprisonment for 5 to 99 years or
life. Tex. Penal Code §§ 12.32, 19.02 (c) (Vernon 2005).
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the least, might not regard it as first-degree.168 And it should be added, there will be cases in
which the precise intent of the defendant—whether actually to kill, or whether to inflict injury as
close as possible to death—cannot be known beyond a reasonable doubt, and although it would
make sense to call the crime murder, and a serious grade of murder at that, a California jury
might not be able to do so. By defining murder to include intent to cause serious injury, Texas
enables the jury to find a verdict commensurate with the seriousness of this crime. At the same
time, Texas limits the offense by an objective requirement: a simultaneous act by the defendant
that, viewed extrinsically, is “clearly dangerous to human life.”169
2.

A Real-Life Example: The “I Dare You to Kill Him” Murder

Perhaps it is best to illustrate this contrast by analyzing an example under both sets of
laws. I recall a case, from the days when I tried criminal cases frequently, that will help to
compare these Texas laws to murder statutes conforming to the Pennsylvania pattern. We called
it the “I Dare You to Kill Him” Murder, because it resulted when the killer responded, apparently
reflexively, to a “dare.” A companion who happened to be present taunted the killer-to-be for
reasons unknown, by saying, “I dare you to kill that guy,” whereupon the killer, apparently
without thinking, raised his gun and did just that. The I Dare You to Kill Him Murder did not
result in a published decision of any court, and I have been unable to reconstruct the precise
evidence; nevertheless, I recall the crime with a vividness that probably results from its
senselessness—and from thinking how poorly the Pennsylvania pattern would treat it. In the
Criminal Law casebook of which I am a coauthor, the I Dare You to Kill Him Murder is stated
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The intent to kill would be lacking, and therefore express malice would be absent. Cal. Penal Code § 188 (West
2005). The jury conceivably could find implied malice in the form of an “abandoned and malignant heart,” Id., but
this phrase creates other difficult issues. See infra Pt. II (B) of this Article (discussing second-degree murder).
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Intent to commit a serious injury assault is not enough, even if it causes death; the actor must also commit an “act
clearly dangerous to human life.” Tex. Penal Code § 19.02 (b)(2). This requirement limits assaultive murder with
an objective element.
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hypothetically as follows:170
Two gang members, known as “Big Jim” and “Shorty,” are . . . waiting to do
a drive-by shooting. They do not plan to kill anyone, just to leave a “calling card”
by shooting up a rival’s home. Suddenly, a stranger on a bicycle, unknown to
either of them, approaches. Big Jim says to Shorty, “I dare you to kill this guy.”
Without hesitation, Shorty lifts his gun and shoots. It appears that Shorty’s
conduct is a mere reaction, with no thought or purpose, and in fact Shorty is afraid
of Big Jim and usually does what he tells him to do without question. The bullet
pierces the man’s aorta and immediately kills the victim, who happens to be a
first-generation immigrant working as a message deliverer to support his five
children.
The reader can consider this example as hypothetical, if desired, although it correctly reflects a
real case in its legally significant elements.
Murder, Pennsylvania style, would make a mess out of this case. The jury would be
instructed to look for “premeditation” and “deliberation” in an act that is despicable precisely
because is so bizarre, thoughtless, and inexcusable that an inquiry into these issues does not have
much to do with the blameworthiness of the crime. The jury would be told that no particular time
duration is required for premeditation and deliberation, an instruction that conflicts with the idea
of distinct decisionmaking beforehand that is implied by premeditation and deliberation.171 The
trial court (and appellate judges) might then be required to second-guess the jury’s verdict by
using standards not provided to the jury, including (in California) the Anderson factors.172 This
review, like the instructions to the jury, would not correspond at all to degrees of
blameworthiness.
Specifically, using the Anderson factors, the appellate court probably would find that
there was no “‘planning’ activity,” because the killer did nothing identifiable to prepare for
170

DAVID CRUMP et al., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, STATUTES, AND LAWYERING STRATEGIES 32
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See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
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killing this particular victim that was distinct from the killing itself. Since Anderson focuses on
planning “activity,” rather than the (mental) planning that a premeditation requirement appears to
call for, it seems to require a distinct “activity” beforehand, even though that factor may not
correlate closely with blameworthiness. Here, there is none.173 Then, there is the second
Anderson factor: motive. It seems doubtful that the jury can find a preexisting motive to kill here,
one that would support an inference of premeditation.174 And finally, the third factor, that of a
“particular and exacting” manner of causing death so as to support an inference of premeditation,
is likewise absent, because the killer’s act was reflexive.175 The crime is senseless, thoughtless,
and bizarre, but California might exonerate the I-Dare-You killer of first degree murder precisely
because his act was senseless, thoughtless, and bizarre.176 Once again, the Pennsylvania pattern
seems designed most of all to fit the genteel, intellectual killer of Agatha-Christie-type
mythology, even though in fact it applies more broadly; and it produces nonsensical results when
applied to the brutal, inexcusable kinds of murders of the real world—which are less romantic
but far more common.
But really, the picture is more ambiguous than this analysis would imply. Does
“‘planning’ activity” really mean an act distinct from the killing, after Perez? That opinion
observed that the defendant had acted in a manner analogous to the “reloading” of a gun by
obtaining a second knife after the first one broke.177 There is no comparable action here, in the I
173

See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. Cf. LEVENSON § 5:12 (listing six actions, such as “bringing a
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Dare You to Kill Him Murder. On the other hand, the killing was all one course of conduct in
Perez. If we consider the killing in that way, perhaps planning activity is an unimportant factor,
not one that should keep this I-Dare-You crime from being first-degree. As for “motive,” can it
be inferred from the I-Dare-You statement? Perhaps the motive to support premeditation is there:
a motive to avoid seeming less than macho, by responding to a dare. Although this is a dubious
motive, it is an inferable one. On the other hand, one can infer that because the crime was
reflexive and immediate, no motive sufficient for premeditation is present. Finally, there is the
idea of “particular and exacting” means. But what does “particular and exacting means” mean? If
it means the infliction of injury likely to cause death, a bullet through the aorta seems to qualify.
If, on the other hand, one focuses on the shot itself—a spur-of-the-moment act here, without
careful aiming—the inference of a “particular and exacting” means disappears.
Thus, the so-called guidelines for first-degree murder dissolve into the vaguest kind of
ambiguity when applied to a real case. If that is to happen—if standards applied by reviewing
courts are to turn into nothingness when used to resolve concrete cases—once again, let it be
about something other than the definition of the most serious criminal offense in the Penal Code.
But we are not yet through. There also is the question of the viability of the Anderson
factors themselves: whether Anderson is still good law after Perez. If we look at what the
California court has said, the three Anderson factors are not to be used as exclusive or necessary
requirements.178 This conclusion might (or might not) lead to the upholding of a first-degree
murder verdict in the I Dare You to Kill Him Murder. But if we look at what the California court
in fact did with the three factors in Perez, which was to treat them as exclusive and necessary,
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the I Dare You to Kill Him Murder probably is not first degree.179 The California court has not
provided guidance that would tell us whether it is, or not.
And . . . the picture is even worse than this analysis would suggest. A criminal conviction
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt.180 The jury will be told this, firmly, over and again,
and judges reviewing the jury’s decision will countermand the verdict if the required level of
proof is not present. And the unpleasant reality is that no one can reconstruct this crime—the I
Dare You to Kill Him Murder—with very much accuracy. The prosecution cannot prove the
crime in its case in chief by questioning the killer.181 Its best witness to the premeditationdeliberation issue is that fine citizen, Big Jim, the very provocateur who uttered the phrase, “I
dare you to kill that guy.” But Big Jim has every reason to decline to testify. If he does testify, he
has every motive to falsify. And if instead he testifies truthfully, the jury has every reason to
discount his story—to find reasonable doubt about every aspect of it.182 Therefore, the jury
probably cannot obtain a precise picture of the events that control the premeditation-deliberation
issue, and having reasonable doubts aplenty about that issue, it is required to acquit the killer of
first degree murder even if that is what would result from accurate reconstruction.
A crime definition that depends exclusively on factors that are inherently subject to such
proof vagaries is not a good definition. And one need only reflect for a moment to realize that the
evidence will often present this kind of factual confusion when the issues are as subjective as
premeditation and deliberation. Unless there is definitive evidence from an entirely believable
source, the facts that determine premeditation and deliberation are going to remain ambiguous in
179
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the courtroom, even if they would have been obvious to a neutral observer of the crime.
Whenever the killer acts without witnesses (or with less than precise or credible witnesses, such
as his own friends or coconspirators), the crime of first-degree murder may be unprovable even if
everyone “knows” that it exists.183 And this is a bad state of affairs, one that crime definition
should avoid if possible.
There is another twist, perhaps even more strange than those described above, that would
result if the I-Dare-You murder were to occur in California. As we have seen, the premeditationdeliberation formula is not the only kind of first-degree murder, because the statute also includes
non-premeditated murders committed by poison, lying in wait, and certain other specified means.
One of these other provisions happens to define as first-degree “any murder which is perpetrated
by means of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, intentionally at another person outside
of the vehicle with the intent to inflict death.”184 It is here that the Pennsylvania pattern produces
its most dubious outcomes. If Big Jim and Shorty are sitting on the curb while waiting to be
picked up for their drive-by-shooting when Shorty fires his shot, the murder probably is seconddegree, but if they are already in the car, it is first-degree. This distinction does not correlate
with blameworthiness at all, and it is emblematic of the gaps left in the premeditationdeliberation formula.
Now, let us contrast these results under the Pennsylvania pattern to the Model Penal
Code, as it appears in Texas law. The jury in Texas will be given a relatively clear question: did
the defendant kill intentionally or knowingly? The precision of the bullet wound, to the
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deceased’s aorta, supplies enough to support this inference.185 The alleged reflexiveness of the
offense, even if inferable from the evidence, does not control the outcome, and neither do other
vague unknowables, unrelated to blameworthiness, that the Pennsylvania pattern might use to
determine premeditation and deliberation. If the jury remains unsure about the defendant’s intent
to kill (or knowledge that he is killing), the inference that he must, in a reasonable world, have
intended at least to cause a grievous injury, together with the “act clearly dangerous to human
life” that the defendant committed by shooting at a human being, independently supports a
conviction for the unitarily graded crime of murder in Texas. This conclusion results from the
second type of murder, defined by “intent to cause serious bodily injury.”186 Mitigating factors,
such as the impulsiveness of the I-Dare-You crime (if that is thought to be mitigating), are taken
into account at sentencing, as are the mitigating factors that the impulse did not originate with
the defendant (but instead came from Big Jim) and that the killer may have acted because he was
afraid of Big Jim. As it decides its verdict, the jury uses clear definitions, phrased in words that
non-lawyers can follow. And those terms correspond closely to the standards that reviewing
judges will use in deciding whether to uphold the jury’s verdict, so that the courts can avoid
second-guessing the jury on bases not contained in any statute and not known to the jury.
Results under this simpler Model-Penal-Code-based standard are likely to be more
uniform. The verdict is less likely to be influenced by invidious considerations, such as whether
the defendant is a type of person against whom the jury is prejudiced, and by the same token, the
social class of a high-status individual is less likely to result in a verdict improperly lowered by
jurors’ predilections. The values of the people of the State are more likely to be carried out in the
185
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54

grading of the State’s most serious crimes.
Above all, under the Model Penal Code formulation, the definition of the State’s most
serious crime is not separated from considerations of blameworthiness, as they are under the
Pennsylvania pattern. The drafters of the Model Penal Code, which Texas closely followed,
explained their reasons for rejecting premeditation and deliberation by pointing out the
disconnect between these terms and rational crime grading.187

In fact, as this article has

observed, this thought occurred to the English historian Stephen as early as 1883,188 and it has
been repeated by modern writers. For example, Sean J. Kealy calls premeditation “a poor
indicator of severity,” and he asserts that there must be “better methods for determining which
killings are worthy of society’s most severe penalties.” Premeditated killings, he adds, “are not
necessarily the worst crimes; in fact, many unpremeditated killings shock society’s conscience
more than premeditated murders.”189 England has consistently declined to use premeditation in
defining its modern crimes,190 and American jurisdictions have increasingly rejected the
premeditation-deliberation formula.191 In fact, commentators from States using premeditation,
including California, have argued that it should not be included in any new definition of
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55

murder.192 Texas, by way of contrast, arguably has preserved the connection between crime
definition and blameworthiness by adopting a single degree of murder and authorizing the taking
into account of differences in culpability and severity at sentencing.
All of these advantages are negated, however, by the unstructured “discretion” provided
juries by the California statutes and by the Anderson factors. That discretion should be labeled as
what it really is: lawless arbitrariness. States using the Pennsylvania pattern would do well to
adopt the reasoning of the Model Penal Code by defining a single degree of murder, in terms that
mean what they say.
II.

THE MALICE AFORETHOUGHT CRITERION: DEFINING
MURDER BY MISNOMER AND METAPHOR

A separate problem with the Pennsylvania pattern is that all murder requires “malice
aforethought.”193 This is the defining mental state for murder. First-degree murder, as we have
seen, also requires premeditation and deliberation, but malice aforethought is a necessary
element of both degrees of murder, second-degree as well as first. In fact, this term is a key
ingredient of the Pennsylvania pattern and is to be found in the laws of many States.194 It traces
to the common law and is deeply imbedded in Anglo-American jurisprudence.195 It also is a
term, however, that is subject to severe criticism; in fact, it makes for bad crime definition.
A. Is Malice Aforethought an Unnecessary Double Misnomer?
Malice aforethought does not require malice. Nor does it need to be preceded by any
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aforethought. As a common law term, it may have originated in cases where literal malice
aforethought existed, but it has become a term of art.196 It covers murders where no one is angry
or acts with spite. It covers murders that are not premeditated or deliberate. In fact, it covers
murders that are not even intentional; it is possible to act with malice aforethought by killing
accidentally.197 The term expanded through common law evolution to include such unintentional
homicides as those resulting from certain kinds of assaults, those committed during felonies,
those perpetrated while resisting arrest (possibly), and those exhibiting depravity: “depravedheart” murder.198 Malice aforethought became a flexible, useful term that simply stood for, and
could be translated as, “the required mens rea for murder.” Most lawyers understand these
principles from having taken Criminal Law courses.
But jurors do not come to court with an awareness of what the term “malice
aforethought” means. It must be explained to them, and the explanation unfortunately must begin
with the proposition that the jurors should not listen to the actual words of the judge’s charge,
because they do not mean what they say. As Lafave puts it, the term is “misleading.”199 Usually,
malice aforethought is explained in instructions at the end of the case as either “express malice,”
which can be supplied by “intent,” or as “implied malice,” which can be supplied by several
means, such as proof that the defendant acted with an “abandoned and malignant heart” (or, in
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some jurisdictions, with a “depraved heart”).200 The instructions usually do not expressly say that
the terms “malice” and “aforethought” do not mean what they say, although this is the real
significance of the instructions.201 The jury might as well be told that malice aforethought is a
double misnomer: a label that means something quite different than what its words say, or rather,
in this instance, a pair of labels used in misleading senses, as Lafave says. The task of educating
the jurors about the meaning of malice aforethought early in the case usually falls to the
prosecutor, and sometimes to the defense lawyer as well.202 Usually, with the consumption of
adequate time, the jurors can be reasonably educated about the fact that malice aforethought does
not mean what it says. But that does not mean that jury instructions that contradict the jury’s
task, or that require jurors to ignore the judge’s words, are a good idea.
I have had an unusual kind of experience with these issues, because early on, I tried
murder cases under laws that required “malice aforethought” instructions, and later, I also tried
murder cases in which the laws were phrased in terms of the Model Penal Code requirements of
“intent” and “knowledge.”203 In malice-aforethought cases, the jury voir dire required a lengthy
colloquy with the jury, centered upon the fact that the instructions would not mean what they
said when the jurors received them at the end of the case. “Mr. / Ms. Jones, you understand, do
you not, that malice is just a word, and it does not mean what it says? That when the judge uses
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it, it really just means intent, or a ‘depraved heart’?” This questioning would be followed by the
same treatment of the term, “aforethought,” and all of it would be preceded by an explanation of
the double misnomer contained in the key phrase. It was difficult to accomplish this juryeducation function, however, consistently with meaningful jury examination, because many
judges before whom I practiced preferred to have the voir dire for each side concluded within a
half hour to an hour. The effort spent unraveling the meaning of malice aforethought consumed a
major part of that time, making it impractical to address other important subjects.204 Even aside
from the limitations imposed by time, jurors are like other human beings and can absorb only a
certain number of foreign concepts at one sitting. The principles involved in understanding the
non-terminology of malice aforethought always seemed to elbow out understanding of other
important concepts. After the Model Penal Code version became the law in Texas, juries seemed
to understand from the beginning the definitions of murder, lesser offenses, and defenses, about
which they had seemed confused before. And a jury that comprehends the law while hearing the
evidence seems more likely to acquit or convict in accordance with the law.
Again, let me emphasize that it usually is possible to educate the jury about malice
aforethought. I doubt that many jurors decide murder cases believing that murder can only result
from ill will or spite, or that murders can only result from thinking about killing beforehand,
because the voir dire or opening statement or final argument, if done competently, will inform
them otherwise. This is by no means the most serious defect in the Pennsylvania pattern. The fact
remains, however, that the double misnomer in malice aforethought is unnecessary. It could be
remedied by a simple but elegant solution: the legislature could delete the phrase, “malice
aforethought” entirely, and instead use the definitions that are to be given of that phrase. The
204

The trial of a murder indictment often involves multiple lesser included offenses as well as multiple defensive
theories. Each of these also has multiple elements that the jury must understand.
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phrase, malice aforethought, contributes nothing, and more specific instructions, to the effect that
the guilty mental state can be supplied by an “intentional” killing or by a killing accompanied by
the conditions corresponding to an “abandoned and malignant heart,”205 would convey all of the
meaning that there is to convey.
This solution would eliminate the wasted time consumed by the need to explain the
misnomer. It would prevent that explanation from crowding out an understanding of other
important principles. And although I doubt that malice aforethought is frequently a misleading
factor (because competent lawyers address it carefully), there probably are instances in which the
double misnomer does result in miscarriages of justice, both by inappropriate conviction and by
inappropriate acquittal.206 The malice-aforethought distractant, it should be remembered, is
cumulative of the confusion created by the premeditation requirement. “Premeditation” does
suggest a kind of “aforethought” element, and so jurors must understand that the maliceaforethought issue is different. They must separate out the aforethought aspect of first degree
murder from the non-aforethought that is required for murders generally, even though the jury
instructions literally call for “aforethought” for all murders. Each of these concepts requires
jurors to cross-reference different parts of the judge’s instructions, and the law recognizes that
repeated cross-referencing creates confusion in lay readers.207 The malice label, too, may linger
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In fact, California has adopted this kind of omission and substitution for another phrase, “abandoned and
malignant heart.” Although this phrase is in the California murder statute, CALJIC § 8.11 omits it from jury
instructions defining malice and instead informs the jury only of the underlying meaning. See infra notes 223-25
and accompanying text.
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lingered with them. And the opposite also is possible: an irrational acquittal resulting from the absence of hatred or
anger. These events likely are infrequent, but they seem likely to occur sometimes, and any occurrence of them is
unnecessary—except for the persistence of the double misnomer in the definition of murder.
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See, e.g., Wheatly v. Myung Sook Suh, 504 A.2d 792, aff’d, 525 A.2d 340 (N.J. App. 1987) (applying New
Jersey’s Plain Language Act to impose damages upon proponents of a confusing contract, including “[c]ross
references that are confusing” as one indicator of unacceptable text). And, of course, there are many articles about

60

to cause confusion. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that the existence of ill will between
killer and victim, even though not exhibited in the killing itself, could tip the jury into finding
murder when it would find only manslaughter if instructed without the misnomer, and likewise,
the absence of spite or anger could result in a manslaughter conviction when the jury would have
properly found murder if instructed in a more straightforward manner.
Add to all of this the ingredient of skillful lawyering by an attorney on one side or the
other, who is determined to use the malice aforethought instruction to make it mean something
that, properly defined, it should not, and the possibility of miscarriage of justice is multiplied.208
Finally, there is an inherent danger in jury instructions from the judge that require telling the jury
that the instructions do not mean what they say. The recognition that the judge’s instructions
contain meaningless gobbledygook might easily expand into a general suspicion by jurors that
other parts of the charge can similarly be ignored or redefined. The jury usually attempts to
follow the charge,209 and it does not seem wise to create disrespect for this effort.
The Model Penal Code avoids these disadvantages by eliminating the double misnomer
of malice aforethought. The malice terminology at one time may have been useful as a matter of
common law evolution, but then, horses and buggies once were useful means for Californians
and Pennsylvanians to travel to work, and keeping the malice formula today has about as much
to commend it. The Texas approach, based on the MPC, uses intent and knowledge, followed by

the intelligibility of jury instructions. See, e.g., Dean E. Murphy, New Language for Jurors in California: Plain
English, N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 2005 at 112; Final Approval of Amendments to Jury Instructions Under Rule 226a,
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, 68 Tex. B.J. 202, 204 (2005).
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See DAVID CRUMP et al, supra note 15, at 51.
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See generally HARRY A. KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 219, 220-41 & n.31 (1966)
(concluding that juries usually follow charges, although they may emerge with erroneous notions if charges are not
clearly explained to them).
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definitions that correspond to common uses of those terms.210 Extensive cross-referencing is not
necessary, nor does the jury need to be told that words in the charge do not mean what they say.
B. Adjudication by Metaphor: “Depraved Heart” Murder”
And there is an even more serious defect contained within the malice formula. So called
“express” malice often is defined under the Pennsylvania pattern as intent.211 Aside from the
unnecessary rigmarole that it takes to get this point across because of the malice misnomer,
intentional murder seems reasonably likely to be understandable to lay jurors. But there are other
categories of malice aforethought called “implied” malice. One kind, which arises frequently, is
“depraved heart” murder, or as the California statutes put it, murder committed unintentionally,
but with an “abandoned and malignant heart.”212 This statutory provision attempts to achieve a
kind of crime definition by literary metaphor.
Defining legal duties by metaphor is a bad idea. Poets use metaphors, and in special
situations so do other kinds of writers. But poets usually employ them for very different reasons
than to define crimes or to convict and punish people. Poetic metaphors are usually designed to
show abstract truths in a way that sounds good, that surprises the ear, and that challenges the
reader. In fact, confusion often is part of the literary character of a figure of speech: a felicitously
sonorous phrase that means two or more distinct things at the same time.213 The figure of speech
contained in the line, “O, my luve’s like a red, red rose,” could not be used very well to explain
210

See supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
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Cal. Penal Code § 188 (West 2005).
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Id. See generally LEVENSON § 5:8 (discussing this kind of murder). There is yet another kind of implied
malice in California based on a complex concept called the “provocative act” doctrine, which can apply, for
example, to a defendant who initiates a gun battle in which another perpetrator kills. LEVENSON § 5:9. The
provocative act doctrine is beyond the scope of this article, except to the extent that it might be observed that this is
another unruly set of complexities that would be unnecessary if California adopted a more straightforward homicide
law.
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in a literal way what the author’s love is really like.214 A metaphor is a species of analogy, and
usually it is a far-fetched analogy at that. In any event, analogy is a type of inductive logic in
which one thing is inferred to be similar to another in one aspect because of ostensibly unrelated
similarities in another aspect, and it requires careful selection of the similarities upon which to
build the metaphor and careful restriction of the inferences to be drawn from them.215 For
precision, reasoning by analogy is inferior to the deductive logic that proceeds from
definitions.216 A standard dictionary does not depend upon metaphors to define the meaning of
words, and neither should jury instructions.
In particular, a metaphor such as “abandoned and malignant heart” is too indeterminate to
serve well in crime definition.217 What does it mean? Most of us, from time to time, display what
might be labeled an “abandoned and malignant heart” in our dealings with some moral
dilemmas, but that does not mean that we display the state of mind corresponding to
blameworthiness for murder. The resulting jury instruction, if it uses these words, resembles
telling a group of decisionmakers, “Decide whether you think the defendant is as evil as a
pomegranate, and if so, convict him of murder.” “As evil as a pomegranate,” although less
familiar, conveys about as much information as “abandoned and malignant heart” does in
213

See RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 851 (1995) (defining the term as “application
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defining murder. One commentator suggests that the depraved-heart metaphor may have “no
meaning at all.”218 As this article has observed in connection with the premeditation-deliberation
formula, there is a long line of cases in which the United States Supreme Court has insisted upon
relatively precise definition of crimes, and the Court has explained that the principal reason is to
confine the decisions of governmentally empowered actors.219 This concern includes jurors who
are given instructions about convicting a defendant of murder.
In fact, there have been defendants who have argued that the depraved-heart metaphor is
so indeterminate that it is unconstitutional. In Thomas v. State,220 for example, a defendant in
Nevada was sentenced to death for a murder. He argued on appeal that the jury charge, which
contained an instruction allowing conviction for murder committed with an “abandoned and
malignant heart,” denied him due process because “it uses terms that are archaic, without rational
content, and merely pejorative.” The court observed, however, that it had “previously rejected
these contentions” and dismissed the argument with a string citation.221 The court arguably was
correct in holding that depraved heart murder is not unconstitutional, if only because that holding
would judicially outlaw the use of a term that was current at the time of the founding of the
United States222 and that has existed in the majority of States. But the defendant’s criticisms had
a point to them: depraved heart murder is, indeed, “archaic, without rational content, and merely

York’s analogous definition, which the courts have changed to an objective formula); LEVENSON § 5:8
(“‘abandoned and malignant heart’ is not well defined”; preferring definition that does not use this phrase).
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Michael H. Hoffheimer, supra note 217, at 111.
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83 P.3d 818 (Nev. 2004).

221

Id. at 827.

222

The depraved-heart terminology traces at least as far back as 1762. SIR MICHAEL FOSTER, CROWN LAW
265 (1762), as quoted in Darry v. People, 10 N.Y. 120, 139. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 199 (1769), gives several examples of the kind of “wicked, depraved and malignant
heart” that can supply malice. For pre-constitutional use of the term in America, see, e.g., State v. Norris, 2 N.C. (1
Hayw.) 429, 445 (1796) (reflecting a jury charge using Blackstone’s language).
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pejorative.” At the very least, a legislature or a reviewing court exercising supervisory authority
over jury instructions should require a more precise definition of the crime of murder before a
death sentence can be imposed.
This is one way, actually, in which some pattern jury instructions in California arguably
have evolved for the better. Jury instructions on implied malice found in CALJIC 8.11 omit the
“abandoned and malignant heart” metaphor. Instead, they substitute meaningful and intelligible
language:223
. . . Malice is implied when:
1. The killing resulted from an intentional act;
2. The natural consequences of the act are dangerous to human life; and
3. The act was deliberately performed with knowledge of the danger to, and with
conscious disregard for, human life.
The problems raised by this instruction, however, are significant.

The first is that this

formulation, by omitting the “abandoned and malignant heart” formula, does not use the
statutory language passed by the legislature. One can argue that it translates the legislation into
different words and thereby changes the meaning enacted by the lawmaking body (although that
conclusion depends upon discerning a coherent legislative meaning).

Courts in other

jurisdictions may feel a proper reluctance to substitute a newly invented phrase for that contained
in the statute. This conjecture may lie behind Nevada’s repeated rejection, mentioned above, of
complaints against the definition of depraved heart murder. Second, the substituted definition is
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Committee on Standard Jury Instructions, California Jury Instruction—Criminal (CALJIC) § 8.11 (West 2005).
The court in People v. Dellinger, 783 P.2d 200, 205 (Cal. 1989), found “no error” in giving an earlier version of this
instruction, although it cautioned that it could be error if combined with arguments undermining its subjective
requirements.
In fact, the California Supreme Court has disapproved instructions that depend upon the “abandoned and
malignant heart” language. People v. Phillips, 414 P.2d 353 (Cal. 1966) (reasoning that the language was
misleading). On the other hand, it can be argued that a court should not substitute its own standard for that of the
legislature, and that the statutory words should be included, even if they are to be followed by interpretive
instructions.
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not as readily intelligible as it seems. For example, the word “deliberate” as used here does not
mean what the same word means in the definition of first-degree murder. The cases caution that
it means only intent here,224 and the jury must keep the difference in mind to apply the definition
correctly (although it may not be told about this fine distinction, because it is not mentioned in
CALJIC 8.11). Finally, the definition of depraved-heart murder in California seems to remain in
flux, with two possible branches, one of which stresses objective criteria such as “wantonness”
more than the other, which is a more clearly subjective branch.225 The better solution would be
legislative revision that gets rid of the depraved-heart metaphor and substitutes clearer language.
Furthermore, in Pennsylvania-pattern jurisdictions that continue to use the depraved heart
metaphor to instruct juries, the terminology is not merely indeterminate. It also is defective for
the additional reason that it invites the jury to make its decision on an invidious basis. Most
people who commit murders or manslaughters exhibit judgmental processes that are subject to
criticism and that can be labeled “depraved” or “abandoned and malignant.” After all,
involuntary manslaughter corresponds to (and often is defined in terms of) “recklessness,”226 and
recklessness in some jurisdictions involves conscious indifference to a substantial and unjustified
risk of killing another.227 It can be appropriate in some cases to describe that state of mind as
“depraved,” at least in the ordinary discourse with which must jurors are familiar. Thus, the
depraved-heart metaphor is not very useful as a distinction between murder and manslaughter,
even though that is precisely the function assigned to it. Furthermore, the depraved heart
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metaphor does not prevent jurors from considering matters of “depravity” unrelated to the
murder itself, or even from convicting the defendant, not because of his criminal behavior in this
case, but because of who he is: because the jurors do not like him and consider him “depraved.”
It should be added that the subjective depraved-heart instruction usually is accompanied by
objective charges about its meaning, which may tell the jury that an “extreme indifference to the
value of human life” is required.228 This kind of instruction probably helps to confine the
vagueness and misleading nature of depraved heart murder, but “depravity” or an “abandoned
and malignant heart” may remain the principal message. It is too vivid and picturesque to be
redefined by more precise but less interesting images.
Cases involving accusations of murder for killings by dogs are an example of these
disadvantages. In Berry v. Superior Court,229 the defendant used a tethered pit bull dog, which he
knew was capable of killing, to guard his marijuana plants. A two-year-old boy who resided
nearby strayed into an area within reach of the dog, which mauled and killed the toddler. The
judge who presided over the defendant’s preliminary hearing bound him over for trial for
murder. On the defendant’s application for writ of prohibition, the court of appeals upheld the
murder charge as presenting a jury question. The court reasoned,230
[The case law recognizes] two prerequisites for affixing second degree
murder liability upon an unintentional killing. One requirement is the defendant's
extreme indifference to the value of human life, a condition which must be
demonstrated by showing the probability that the conduct involved will cause
death. Another requirement is awareness either (1) of the risks of the conduct, or
(2) that the conduct is contrary to law. Here, evidence of the latter requirement is
228

Cf. Id. § 210.2(1)(b) (MPC definition of murder).
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256 Cal. Rptr. 344 (1989) (ordered not published; previously published at 208 Cal. App.3d 783).

In addition to dog mauling cases, there are other situations that uncomfortably straddle the murder-manslaughter
divide. Other important examples include vehicular homicides where drivers are heavily under the influence, such
as People v. Watson, 30 Cal.3d 290 (1981), and some kinds of homicides resulting from child maltreatment or
neglect, People v. Burden, 72 Cal. App.3d 703 (1977).
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first, that the very possession of [the dog] may have constituted illegal keeping of
a fighting dog. Second, there is evidence that defendant kept [the dog] to guard
marijuana plants, also conduct with elements of illegality and antisocial purpose.
Thus the second element . . . required could be satisfied here in a number of ways.
Thus there is a basis from which the trier of fact could derive the two
required elements of implied malice, namely existence of an objective risk and
subjective awareness of that risk. Additionally, there is arguably some base and
antisocial purpose involved in keeping the dog (1) because harboring a fighting
dog is illegal and (2) because there is some evidence the dog was kept to guard an
illegal stand of marijuana. Illegality of the underlying conduct is not an element
of the charge, but may be relevant on the issue of subjective intent.
In other words, the use of a non-fighting dog might have changed the result, even if the
defendant had known of an identical risk that the dog would kill. So would have the use of the
dog to guard something that was not independently illegal, such as money. It is unclear why
those factors should determine something so fundamental as the difference between guilt and
innocence of murder, as opposed to furnishing factors that might be taken into account at
sentencing.
The California Supreme Court’s treatment of Berry after the court of appeals’s
affirmance confused the issue.

Although the court of appeals opinion had already been

published, the California Supreme Court retroactively ordered that this opinion not be officially
published.231 This action deprived the opinion of precedential value.232 But the supreme court
also denied review, meaning that the trial of Berry for murder could proceed.233 There is no way
to know the reasoning that prompted the court to take these actions, but speculation, which is all
we have left, probably would have to center on the inference that the court did not believe it
could make sense out of the law of depraved heart murder and its distinction from manslaughter
in a way that would justly resolve the case presented by these facts. The aftermath was that the
231
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Cal. Rules of Court 976, 977, 979 (West 2005).
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People prosecuted Berry for murder, but the jury returned a verdict acquitting him of murder and
convicting him instead of the lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter.234 Again, it is difficult
to know why.
Later decisions in which murder has been charged after deaths resulting from dog
maulings have produced inconsistent results from juries and judges. Most recently, for example,
in People v. Noel,235 the jury convicted the defendant of second-degree murder after her dogs
mauled a neighbor to death. The trial court then granted the defendant a new trial because it had
reconsidered the instructions on implied malice. The court of appeals reversed the new trial, on
the ground that “subjective awareness” of a “high probability of death,” which had been the
standard used by the trial court, was not required. Instead, the standard involved either (1) a
“base, antisocial motive [with] wanton disregard of life” or (2) “conduct [that] endangers the life
of another” coupled with “conscious disregard for life.”236 The first standard combines a vague
subjective mens rea (motive) with an amorphously defined objective aspect (wantonness). The
second is confusingly similar to frequent definitions of recklessness, which is a typical basis for
manslaughter in most jurisdictions, not murder.237 The California Supreme Court has granted
review in Noel,238 and there is a chance that the court may clarify the standard to distinguish
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28 Cal. Rptr.3d 369 (2005) (review granted; previously published at 128 Cal. App.4th 1391). See also
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It should be added that California uses both “gross negligence” and “recklessness” to define its offense of
involuntary manslaughter. Id. at 410, quoting People v. Penny, 285 P.2d 926 (Cal. 1955) (defining involuntary
manslaughter in terms of “aggravated, gross, reckless conduct” and also quoting cases requiring only “gross
negligence”). The statute requires a killing “without due care or circumspection,” which actually sounds like
ordinary (civil) negligence. Cal. Penal Code § 192(b) (West 2005). See also infra Pt. IIIB of this article (analyzing
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murder clearly from manslaughter and avoid vague words such as “wanton.” Reduction of
depraved-heart murder to a unitary definition featuring conscious indifference to human life as a
subjective requirement, combined with a required objective element of an act dangerous to
human life, would rationalize this standard in a manner consistent with the statute.239 It still
would remain difficult to distinguish from manslaughter, but it would improve the Pennsylvania
pattern.
Again, I believe that the Model Penal Code, as it is reflected for example in the law of
Texas, is superior to this California confusion. Texas flatly would not authorize an indictment for
murder in a case such as Berry or Noel. The defendants there did not act intentionally or
knowingly to kill, did not intend serious bodily injury, and did not commit a causally related
felony, and thus they would not have qualified for conviction under the Texas murder statute.240
Instead, with evidence of recklessness, Texas would authorize indictment and conviction for
manslaughter.241 One can argue persuasively that some reckless killings should be characterized
as murders, as they would be in a depraved-heart jurisdiction such as California but would not be
in Texas. For example, if an enraged, jilted lover were to drive an automobile onto a busy
sidewalk, killing a dozen people, although not aiming at anything in particular, shouldn’t his act
be murder? A partial answer is that it probably would be murder in Texas, if the defendant acted
“knowingly” with respect to the probability of killing. But even if the “knowingly” argument
fails, the clarity and absence of ambiguity with which the crime can be set forth in Texas is a
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positive value in the criminal law.
A jury in this MPC-influenced jurisdiction would be instructed straightforwardly about
this crime, in terms of a concept of recklessness that would be explained by a definition
consistent with the common understanding of that term. A conviction for manslaughter in Texas,
which is based closely on the Model Penal Code, carries a maximum penalty of twenty years
imprisonment:242 more than enough to allow a sentence in Berry, for example, commensurate
with the defendant’s relative blameworthiness. There would be no need for an application for
writ of prohibition or for a court of appeals opinion interpreting “abandoned and malignant
heart” in terms of marijuana plants. There would be no need for a Supreme Court order avoiding
the question but retroactively assigning a published opinion to nonpublished status. There
probably would be less inconsistency among juries and judges, if such a case had arisen in a
Model Penal Code jurisdiction, because both the insufficiency of the evidence for murder, and its
sufficiency for manslaughter, would be relatively unambiguous.
III.

MANSLAUGHTER: LESSER-DEGREE HOMICIDES

A. Voluntary Manslaughter: A Passion Killing, Arising from an Adequate Cause
The California law of voluntary manslaughter, unlike the law of murder, does not exhibit
so many arguable deficiencies. In fact, it avoids some of the mistakes that the drafters of the
Model Penal Code fell into in defining this crime. The California law of voluntary
manslaughter243 is functionally similar to the law in Texas governing passion killings, except that
Texas does not create a differently labeled crime—in Texas, the crime remains murder, even if
committed under passion circumstances, and the provocation element is reflected in a lessened
242

Tex. Penal Code §§ 12.33, 19.04 (Vernon 2005) (defining manslaughter as second-degree felony; setting
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sentencing range, analogous to the lesser sentence for the passion crime in California. Also,
Texas places upon the defendant the burden of proving the factual elements for this reduction.244
It can be argued that the Texas version is preferable, and I would argue this; in truth, however,
the structural245 differences are debatable.
The California statute defining voluntary manslaughter provides that this crime exists
when the killing is “without malice” because it arises “upon a sudden quarrel or heat of
passion.”246 If this were all that there was to it, the definition would be inadequate, because it
would allow hotheads to invoke the lesser crime whenever they felt passion, without a
requirement that the passion arise from a recognizably passion-producing source.247 Therefore,
Pennsylvania248 and California249 are like many other jurisdictions250 in imposing additional
requirements by judicial interpretation. These additional elements typically fall into four further
categories: an adequate cause251 underlying the passion, an objective measure of the adequacy of
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the cause by reference to the common (or ordinary or average) person,252 an element of
suddenness or immediacy that prevents “cooling” of the passion,253 and a requirement that the
origin of the passion be traceable to the person killed or others acting with that person.254 Thus, a
perception that the intended victim has been intimate with the killer’s spouse,255 or an attack by
the deceased that provokes the killer but that does not rise to the level that justifies self
defense,256 are traditional kinds of adequate causes. But circumstances that would not impair the
reasoning of an ordinary person, such as the deceased’s resistance to the defendant’s request for
money,257 or (in some jurisdictions) a nonthreatening sexual advance,258 would not invoke

252

E.g., People v. Steele, 27 Cal.4th 1230, 47 P.3d 225 (2002) (rejecting argument based on defendant’s alleged
“psychological dysfunction based on traumatic experiences in the Vietnam War” and that “he ‘snapped’ when he
heard [a] helicopter” because it “does not satisfy the objective, reasonable person requirement” but is closer to
“diminished capacity,” which “the legislature has abolished”); see also Tex. Penal Code § 19.02(a) (Vernon 2005)
(requiring measurement by “person of ordinary temper” in statute). See LAFAVE 784; LEVENSON § 5:50.
253

Cf. State v. Mauricio, 117 N.J. 402, 568 A.2d 879 (1990) (declaring that the time adequate for “cooling off” is
not measured by any definition “yardstick” but depends upon such factors as the extent of the passion and the nature
of the provocation). With respect to California, see authority cited in supra note 249; as to Texas, see Tex. Penal
Code § 19.02 (d) (Vernon 2005) (requiring by statute that the act occur under the “immediate influence” of “sudden
passion”). See also LEVENSON § 5:51 (discussing California requirement of no “sufficient cooling-off period”).
LAFAVE 786 divides this factor into two subissues: (1) that an objectively “reasonable” time to cool off has not
expired and (2) that the defendant subjectively has not in fact cooled off. Thus, if the defendant is unusually cold
blooded, has cooled off in less time than the average or reasonable person, and kills without passion, the offense is
murder, not manslaughter. Cf. People v. Pouncey, 437 Mich. 382, 471 N.W.2d 346 (1991) (holding that defendant’s
own testimony that he was “not angry” barred manslaughter instructions in spite of passion-producing event).
254

E.g., State v. Turgeon, 165 Vt. 28, 676 A.2d 339 (1996) (holding that “heated exchange” between husband and
wife did not extend the possibility of manslaughter to killing of “a third party who was not involved in the initial
altercation,” here a state trooper pursuing husband). See also LEVENSON § 5:50 (explaining California
requirement of causation by victim or at least of reasonable belief in causation by victim). With respect to Texas,
see § 19.02(a) (Vernon 2005) (declaring by statute that passion must arise out of “provocation by the individual
killed or another acting with the person killed”).
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Cf. Maher v. People, 81 Am. Dec. 781 (Mich. 1862) (reversing conviction for assault with intent to murder where
trial court excluded evidence allegedly showing assault committed shortly after defendant learned circumstances
suggesting tryst between victim and defendant’s wife).
256

Cf. State v. Avery, 120 S.W.3d 196 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (requiring manslaughter instruction even if jury were to
reject self-defense where defendant testified to conduct of deceased that assertedly frightened her).
257

E.g., Caudill v. Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 635 (Ky. 2004) (deciding case under Kentucky’s “extreme
emotional disturbance” standard derived form Model Penal Code; holding that “reasonable explanation or excuse”
required by statute gain derived from MPC, was not supplied here by recent death of defendant’s former boyfriend,
or argument with current boyfriend, or drug dependency, or victim’s refusal to provide money for drugs).

258

E.g., People v. Page, 737 N.E.2d 264 (Ill. 2000) (holding alleged same-sex advance insufficient to raise issue of
manslaughter; rejecting “homosexual panic” theory). But the exact point at which to end this rejection of sexual
advance, and to accept sexual overtures as a basis for manslaughter, is controversial. Cf. Id. (suggesting that a
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voluntary manslaughter. A killing taking place days later, after a time of brooding, also does not
qualify, on the theory that suddenness is more indicative of lesser behavioral control and
therefore lesser blameworthiness than action taken after mature reflection. The theory is that the
delay should have caused the passion to have cooled and the mental impairment resulting from it
to have dissipated.259 And if the defendant kills a victim who is unrelated to the cause of the
passion, such as a police officer who properly intervenes, the killing does not qualify for
reduction to voluntary manslaughter even though the killing of a victim who caused the passion
might have.260 These limits upon voluntary manslaughter, which are present in many States in
one form or another, are generally present in California as in the analogous Texas doctrine,261
although they are defined in California by varying court interpretations rather than by statute.
The corresponding Texas provision is analogous but more carefully defined by
contemporary language in the statute itself.262 The Texas statute avoids the anomalous California
requirement that the killing be committed “without malice,”263 which is illogical264 because

“struggle” precipitated by the advance may suffice); see also Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (discussing
Maine law construed to allow reduction to manslaughter upon same-sex advance; invalidating Maine’s statutes on
other grounds). See generally Joshua Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?: Some Reflections on a
Difficult Subject, 86 MINN. L. REV. 959 (2002) (discussing issues related to sexual advanced as bases for
manslaughter, including whether the heat of passion doctrine itself ought to be retained).
259

Cf. State v. Follin, 263 Kan. 28, 947 P.2d 8 (1997) (rejecting manslaughter upon passage of ten hours as “more
time . . . than it would have taken an ordinary person to retain reason”). But the time is said to be flexible, and its
treatment varies. See supra note 253. Also, past provocation can be revived by a new episode, sometimes even by
one that would not suffice by itself. People v. Berry, 18 Cal.3d 509, 556 P.2d 777 (1976) (wife’s screaming held
sufficient to rekindle passion based on earlier adultery). The kind of “cumulative provocation” recognized in Berry
complicates the cooling-off analysis.
260

See supra note 254.

261

Cf. supra notes 246, 249, 251-54, 59 (citing Texas and California authorities). See generally LEVENSON
§§ 5:50-5:51 (discussing California limits).
262

See supra notes 251-54 and accompanying text.

263

See supra notes 246 and accompanying text.

264

Cf. Smith v. State, 83 Ala. 26, 3 So. 551 (1888) (explaining that voluntary manslaughter arises because “passion
disturbed the sway of reason,” not because it “stripped the act of killing of the intent to commit it”). If intent is
malice, voluntary manslaughter is not “without malice,” because it is intentional. But cf. LEVENSON § 5:49
(explaining California doctrine that voluntary manslaughter is “without malice”).
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intent supplies malice for murder, and voluntary manslaughter is usually an intentional crime.265
But this difference probably is not significant in most cases, because the rest of the statute
implies what the jury ought to infer: that the defendant’s passion negates malice, even though it
otherwise would be supplied by intent. Nevertheless, the reference to malice is confusing, and it
is better to omit it, as Texas does. Furthermore, Texas includes statutory treatments of sudden
passion, adequate cause, the timing element, and the requirement of causation by the victim, in
terms that are consistent with the ordinary understandings of these words.266 The inclusion of the
language in the statute itself allows more faithful conformity of verdicts, and of their review, to
the legislative intent. The real point, however, is that the approaches of California and Texas are
not greatly different.
But there are two more fundamental differences between Texas and California laws
governing passion killings. The first is that Texas does not recognize a separate offense of
voluntary manslaughter at all. An intentional or knowing killing remains murder, even if
committed in the heat of passion arising from an adequate cause.267 The sentence range simply is
reduced without redefinition of the crime.268 The second is that the defendant, not the
prosecution, bears the burden of proving the factors that govern this sentence reduction.269 The

265

It can arise without intent to kill when committed, for example, with intent to cause serious injury or with a
depraved heart, because these circumstances also authorize conviction for murder. Cf. United States v. Paul, 37 F.3d
496 (9th cir. 1994) (authorizing manslaughter for unintentional but extremely reckless killing); see generally
LAFAVE 776 (giving other example). But these mental states are effective to support murder only because they
also constitute malice, and therefore to refer to any of these kinds of killings as “without malice,” because
committed under heat of passion, seems equally illogical. In any event, intent to kill is so typically the underlying
mens rea for voluntary manslaughter that the law of many States assume it as a condition. Cf. People v. Brubaker,
53 Cal.2d 37, 346 P.2d 8 (1959) (defining the offense as “characterized by . . . an intent to kill”).
266

See supra notes 251-54 and accompanying text.
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Tex. Penal Code § 19.02(d) (Vernon 2005) (reducing grade of felony to second degree rather than first under
heat-of-passion circumstances, even though offense remains murder).

268

Id. §§ 12.32-.33 (defining maxima as life or 99 years for first-degree felonies such as murder without passion and
as 20 years for second-degree such as murder with passion findings).

269

The defendant must “prove[ ] the issue in the affirmative by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id.
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relevant language is in a subsection of the same section that contains the definition of murder:270
(d) At the punishment stage of a trial, the defendant may raise the issue as to
whether he caused the death under the immediate influence of sudden passion
arising from an adequate cause. If the defendant proves the issue in the
affirmative by a preponderance of the evidence, the offense is [reduced to] a
felony of the second degree.
Some other jurisdictions, such as New York271 and Maine,272 also place the burden of proof on
the defendant even if they do not eliminate voluntary manslaughter.
Although the issue is debatable, one can argue that the Texas treatment of passion
killings, which Texas adopted after rejecting its former separately defined offense of voluntary
manslaughter that placed the burden of proof on the prosecution,273 is superior to that of
California. The killing, by definition, is intentional or at least qualifies to support a murder
conviction,274 and the passion-clouded mind that lowers its blameworthiness does not change
either this mental state or the nature of the act. The survivors of the homicide, including those
close to the victim, deserve a label fitting an unexcused intentional killing. Labeling this kind of
killing as murder, even if it arguably is of lesser blameworthiness because of passion, may be a
departure from the historical terminology of voluntary manslaughter, but it fits the label better to
270

Tex. Penal Code § 19.02(d) (Vernon 2005).

271

N.Y. Penal Law §§ 125.20, 125.25 (McKinney 1990) (providing that “extreme emotional disturbance” reduces
murder to first-degree manslaughter but “need not be proved in any prosecution” for homicide). The United States
Supreme Court upheld the resulting placement of the burden upon the defendant in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S.
197 (1977), by treating the reduction as an “affirmative defense” distinct from the elements of murder.

272

Maine Rev. Stat. Ann. § 2.01(3)-(4) (West 2003) (providing “affirmative defense” to murder upon proof of
“extreme anger or extreme fear brought about by adequate provocation,” as defined). An earlier Main statute had
defined malice as an essential element of murder that could be rebutted by the defendant’s proof of heat of passion,
but the United States Supreme Court held this earlier statute unconstitutional because it placed on the defendant the
burden of disproving an offense element. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). Later, Maine revised its
murder statute to eliminate malice as a required element and to substitute “intentionally or knowingly” causing
death, and it simultaneously redefined the conditions for reduction to manslaughter as an affirmative defense.
Maine thus conformed its law to Patterson v. New York, see supra note 271, and accomplished the same objective—
shifting the burden to the defendant—in a manner approved by the Court.
273

Acts 1973, 63rd Tex. Leg., p. 883, ch. 339, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974 (then codified as Tex. Penal Code § 19.03).

274

In rare instances it may be unintentional but still exhibits the state of mind required for murder. See supra note
265.
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the crime. The measure of the sentence inflicted on the defendant is changed, however, so that
the objective treatment of the killer reflects the passion, and thus the law arguably reflects
relative blameworthiness by confining the consequences for the defendant to a lesser penalty.
Placing the burden of proof upon the defendant can be justified by the observation that
this issue of sudden-passion-from-adequate-cause arises only after the prosecution has proved an
intentional murder, and it concerns a matter that the prosecution inherently is less likely to be
capable of proving beyond a reasonable doubt even if it is true: the precise motivation of the
defendant.275 Often, the defendant is the only one who can offer firsthand evidence of the passion
requirements. Given that the jury has found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant has
removed the most obvious other potential witness (by killing the witness), a requirement that the
defendant’s invocation of sentence reduction should reach a level of probable truth arguably
achieves the right balance.276 In fact, modern commentators have called for the abolition or strict
confinement of voluntary manslaughter. These arguments have come from writers of widely
different philosophies: from law-enforcement advocates who see the lesser offense as providing
a too-easy escape from liability,277 on the one hand, to feminists who argue, on the other hand,
that it operates unfairly toward women.278 The Texas provision honors the intentions of these

275

One ground for classifying a principle defining liability as an affirmative defense is knowledge and control of the
relevant information by the defendant. A particular instance concerns the subjective mental state of the defendant,
which may be difficult for the opponent to prove. Cf. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980) (holding that goodfaith immunity from liability for civil rights violation is an affirmative defense) (civil case).

276

Other principles of law analogously treat the proof differently if a party has removed witnesses. Cf. Fed. R. Evid.
804(b)(6) (providing that the hearsay rule is subject to “forfeiture by wrongdoing” if a party engages or acquiesces
in procurement of the unavailability of a witness). The analogy is imperfect, but perhaps the same consideration
reinforces the argument for treating the passion issue as an affirmative defense, given that the defendant, by
definition, has procured the unavailability of the most knowledgeable other witness, and has done so with a state of
mind that otherwise would suffice for murder.
277

“[P]rovocation law is under attack. . . . [O]ne might expect law and order advocates to criticize a doctrine that can
permit an intentional killer to avoid conviction for murder. Joshua Dressler, supra note 258, at 960.
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E.g., Robert B. Mison, Homophobia in Manslaughter: The Homosexual Advance as Insufficient Provocation, 80
CAL. L. REV. 133 (1992); CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR
IN THE COURTROOM (2003); JEREMY HORDER, PROVOCATION AND RESPONSIBILITY 186-97 (1992);
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writers by reining in the passion doctrine, but it does so without eliminating a traditional doctrine
needed to achieve proper crime grading in the views of other commentators.279 Again, these
conclusions are debatable, and they are not nearly as important as other comparisons that can be
made between the statutes of the two States.
In any event, what is more important in this area is that California, like Texas, has
managed to avoid the disadvantages of the comparable crime that is defined in the Model Penal
Code. Although I believe that the MPC has the superior approach to murder committed
purposefully or knowingly, I also think that its definition of voluntary manslaughter is both
vague and inconsistent with degrees of blameworthiness. The Model Penal Code provision
defines manslaughter to include a criminal homicide that would otherwise be murder when it is
committed under the influence of “extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is
reasonable explanation or excuse.”280 Even if this provision reads sensibly, it becomes
indeterminate and results in excusing serious homicides from being treated properly as murders,
when applied to real cases. The MPC formula provides “a new, far broader version of the
[provocation] defense” when contrasted to the “narrow” original concept.281 Nevertheless, the
MPC formulation unfortunately has been adopted in some States, such as Kentucky282 and New

Emily L. Miller, Womanslaughter: Voluntary Manslaughter, Gender, and the Model Penal Code, 50 EMORY L.J.
665, 667-78 (2001); Adrian Howe, More Folk Provoke Their Own Demise (Homophobic Violence and Sexed
Excuses)—Rejoining the Provocation Law Debate, Courtesy of the Homosexual Advance Defense, 19 SYDNEY L.
REV. 336 (1997); Victor Nourse, Passion’s Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106
YALE L.J. 1331 (1997).
279

E.g., Dressler, supra note 258. See also infra authorities cited in note 287.

280

American Law Institute, Model Penal Code § 210.3(b) (1962). The MPC version also expands the scope of the
manslaughter reduction by providing, “The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall be determined from
the viewpoint of a person in the actor’s situation as he perceives them to be.” The objective requirement of a
“reasonable” explanation or excuse thus is diluted by a purely subjective element.

281

Dressler, supra note 258, at 961.

282

Ky. Rev. Stat. 507.020(1)(a)(Baldwin 2003). See Caudill v. Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 635 (Ky. 2004).

The Kentucky statutes seriously blur the distinction between manslaughter and murder. Compare Turner v.
Commonwealth, 153 S.W.3d 823 (Ky. 2005) (reversing “wanton murder” conviction by 4-3 vote) with Id. at 833-35
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York.283
As an example of the dysfunction inherent in the MPC criterion for passion-type
manslaughter, consider the crime of Sirhan Sirhan, who was convicted in California of murder
for killing Senator Robert Kennedy, the brother of President John F. Kennedy and a leading
Presidential candidate in his own right.284 Sirhan claimed that he was provoked to commit the
crime because Senator Kennedy, during his Presidential campaign, had refused to support the
Palestinian cause in the Middle East. As a child, Sirhan had seen and experienced firsthand the
deprivations suffered by Palestinians and the conditions they endured in refugee camps.285 If the
Model Penal Code provision were applicable, the defense could argue persuasively that Sirhan’s
mental state exhibited “extreme emotional disturbance” arising from a “reasonable” cause, and
the prosecution presumably would have the burden of disproving this claim by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.286 The prosecution’s burden would be inherently difficult to carry because of
the vagueness in the concepts of “extreme” disturbance and “reasonable” explanation.
Furthermore, even if the prosecution could have succeeded in proving that Sirhan was not
emotionally disturbed by a long past event in his life that was at some point a reasonable
explanation for passion, it seems anomalous to consider lowering the grade of the offense for
these reasons. The victim was engaged in the political process in a way unrelated to the killer,
(dissenting opinion of Justice Graves, pointing out that wanton murder in Kentucky “requires wanton conduct with
respect to both the act and the circumstances, manifesting an extreme indifference to human life,” whereas “wanton
conduct resulting in homicide” without extreme indifference to human life is only manslaughter).
283

N.Y. Penal Law §§ 125.20, 125.25 (McKinney 1990). New York avoids some excessive breadth by placing the
burden of proof on the defendant. See supra note 271 and accompanying text.

284

See People v. Sirhan, 497 P.2d 1121, 1125 (Cal. 1972).
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Id. at 1127.
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See supra note 280 and accompanying text. Actually, there could be some doubt that the traditional formulation,
in California, completely avoids the effect of the MPC in cases such as Sirhan’s. For example, so-called “cultural
issues” may be applicable in California, although this conclusion is unclear. See People v. Wu, 235 Cal.App.3d 614
(1991) (retroactively ordered unpublished). Even if so, however, the unlikelihood of extreme provocation in an
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the triggering cause was of a kind experienced by many people who are not tempted to kill, the
occurrence had influenced Sirhan only in the remote past, and it seems unlikely that ordinary or
average people would similarly be rendered incapable of cool reflection. By instead retaining
common law limits on the availability of voluntary manslaughter, California has prevented this
kind of result.
It should be added that recent years have seen a wide variety of proposals for redefinition
of the passion or provocation concept.

Some of these proposals are thoughtful and merit

consideration.287 They are beyond the scope of this article, however, because my objective is to
compare existing formulations and to do so on a broad front, and this goal cannot be achieved in
that way.
B. Involuntary Manslaughter: “Without Due Cause or Circumspection”
1.

Is the Crime Really Equivalent to Negligent Homicide?

The general definition in California of the crime of involuntary manslaughter provides
that this offense consists of an unlawful killing, “without malice,” by an “act which might
produce death,” committed “without due caution and circumspection.”288 As in the case of

“ordinary” person, even with cultural factors considered, would seem to preclude the defense, and the cooling-off
factor would, also.
287

Within the year 2005 alone, consider Vera Bergelson, Victims and Perpetrators: An Argument for Comparative
Liability in Criminal Law, 8 BUFFALO CRIM. L. REV. 385 (2005) (proposing doctrine comparing fault of parties);
Stephen P. Garvey, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1677 (2005) (proposing solution based on “akrasia” theory, which
distinguishes those who act in defiance of the law from those who act in a moment of culpable ignorance or
weakness of will); and Deborah W. Denno, Criminal Law in a Post-Freudian World, 205 U. ILL. L. REV. 601
(proposing modern psychological approaches to conscious will as a replacement for Freudian psychology
emphasizing the unconscious, which assertedly was dominant in the 1950’s and 1960’s and therefore framed key
concepts of the Model Penal Code). See also Joshua Dressler, supra note 258 (proposing a provocation defense
“based on a partial excuse theory, separate from the diminished capacity doctrine,” not requiring a criminal act as
provocation but enabling “any actions or words” potentially to qualify, “navigat[ing] a fine line between
subjectivism and objectivism”).
288

Cal. Penal Code § 192(b) (West 2005). This statute also retains the so-called “misdemeanor manslaughter rule,”
in a provision that covers killing “in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony.” See LEVENSON
§ 5:54 (discussing California’s misdemeanor-manslaughter rule). There also are a third and possibly a fourth
variation of this crime. Id. In addition, California defines five different types of vehicular manslaughter. Id. § 5:55.
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voluntary manslaughter, the requirement that the crime be committed “without malice” serves
only to confuse the issue.289 The phrase, “without due care and circumspection,” seems to
suggest that the mens rea is mere negligence—and simple negligence at that,290 of the kind that
would suffice to support a money judgment in a civil case. The case law provides otherwise,
requiring a mens rea roughly corresponding to that of gross negligence291 under the Model Penal
Code.292 This definition closely parallels the provision for the analogous crime of criminally
negligent homicide under the MPC, which consists of a killing with “criminal negligence,”
defined as a “gross deviation” from ordinary standards of care.293 Involuntary manslaughter in
California carries “2, 3, or 4 years” imprisonment, while the similar crime of negligent homicide
in Texas carries “not more than two years or less than 180 days” in a state jail.294
Given this comparison of the two States’ laws, and considering earlier parts of this
article, we can construct a chart showing the general hierarchy of homicidal offenses in each.
This chart will facilitate an analysis of overlaps and gaps in the two sets of laws. Thus, murder

These complex doctrines are beyond the scope of this article except for the observation that they would be
unnecessary in a State with a better constructed homicide jurisprudence.
289

See supra notes 263-64 and accompanying text.
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See LAFAVE 264-67 (distinguishing ordinary negligence from gross negligence and from recklessness);
LEVENSON § 5:54 (defining California’s criminal negligence).
291

The negligence must be “criminal” negligence, meaning that it involves “something more” than ordinary
negligence. It “must be aggravated, culpable, gross, or reckless [and] such a departure from what would be the
conduct of an ordinarily prudent or careful [person] under the same circumstances . . . .” People v. Penny, 44 Cal.2d
861, 869, 876-80 (1955); accord, People v. Bennett, 54 Cal.3d 1032, 1036 (1991); People v. Ochoa, 6 Cal.4th 1199,
1204 (1993). The test “is objective: whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have been aware
of the risk involved.” People v. Valdez, 27 Cal.4th 778, 783 (2002). For a case involving jury instructions, see
People v. Gilbert, 2004 WL 2416833 at 4 (Cal. App.) (unpublished opinion). See also LEVENSON § 5:54 (defining
criminal negligence in California).
292

American Law Institute, Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(d) (1962).
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Tex. Penal Code § 19.05 (Vernon 2005). See also Id. § 6.02 (defining criminal negligence in terms of gross
deviation).

294

Cal. Penal Code § 193 (West 2005); Tex. Penal Code § 12.35 (Vernon 2005). The sentence in Texas is enhanced
to that of a third degree felony (two to ten years) upon proof of exhibition of a deadly weapon or conviction for any
of certain felonies. Id.
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in Texas corresponds to both first-degree and second-degree murder in California.295
Manslaughter in Texas, however, also corresponds roughly to California-style murder of the
“abandoned and malignant heart” variety, at least if the heart is sufficiently “abandoned” to
imply malice.296 No crime in California clearly corresponds to the lesser mens rea of conscious
indifference that is not sufficiently “abandoned” for murder, although the law on this point
currently is confused.297 Texas would call this crime manslaughter.298 Negligent homicide in
Texas corresponds roughly to involuntary manslaughter in California.299 Finally, voluntary
manslaughter in California is analogous to murder-with-sentence-reduction in Texas.300 Put
together, the comparison looks like the chart below.301
Defining
Characteristics

California
Crime

Premeditation
Intent-type malice
Passion killing**

First-degree murder
Second-degree murder
Voluntary
manslaughter
Second-degree murder

Conscious indifference
amounting to abandonedheart malice
Conscious indifference
amounting to
recklessness***
Gross negligence

Sentence
Range (yr)

Texas
Crime

Sentence
Range (yr)

25 minimum
15 minimum
3, 6, or 11

Murder*

5 to 99

15 minimum

Involuntary
manslaughter

2 to 20
Manslaughter

2 to 20

2, 3, or 4

Criminally
½ to 2
negligent homicide
* Texas murder also includes knowledge, as well as intent to cause serious bodily injury coupled with an act
clearly dangerous to life. Both States define certain felony-murders.
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See supra Pt. I of this article.

296

See supra Pt. IIB of this article.
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See supra Pt. IIB of this article. See also supra notes 235-39 (discussing confusion and noting California
Supreme Court’s recent grant of review).
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See supra notes 240-42 and accompanying text.

299

See supra notes 290-93 and accompanying text.

300

See supra notes 243-45.
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It should be remembered that a chart of this kind must contain ambiguities that cannot be clearly labeled. For
example, the line between second-degree murder and involuntary manslaughter in California is indeterminate. The
drawing of any line conceals this ambiguity, although the line must be drawn somewhere to make the chart
meaningful. For an overview of the California homicide law, see LEVENSON § 5:1 (briefly summarizing all grades
of homicidal offenses).
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** If the passion fits the statutory criteria in each State.
*** For recklessness involving conscious indifference but not amounting to abandoned-heart malice, California
defines no separate crime, although this mental state would suffice for involuntary manslaughter. California
also includes misdemeanor-manslaughter. Both States define certain vehicular homicides as crimes.

The chart reinforces several conclusions that this article already has reached.

For

example, it shows graphically the splintering caused by California’s degrees of murder,302 the
murder-manslaughter confusion created by the abandoned-heart metaphor,303 the correspondence
of murder-with-sentence-reduction to voluntary manslaughter,304 and the contrasting simplicity
resulting from the Model Penal Code’s unitary, comprehensive grade of murder.305 But the chart
also shows something about lesser grades of homicide. California does not define any grade of
crime, lesser than murder, corresponding to conscious indifference of the reckless variety.306
Model Penal Code States, such as Texas, define murder when the defendant’s mental state is
intent or knowledge, manslaughter when it is recklessness (involving actual awareness of the
danger of death), and criminally negligent homicide when it is gross negligence.307 This system
produces a relatively smooth and continuous series of gradations roughly proportional to relative
degrees of blameworthiness. California, however, following the Pennsylvania pattern, defines
no distinct crime of reckless homicide.308 Instead, California categorizes the crime as murder if
the recklessness is extreme enough to qualify as abandoned-heart malice,309 but only as

302

See supra Pt. I of this article.

303

See supra Pt. IIB of this article.

304

See supra Pt. IIIA of this article.

305

See supra Pts. ID, IIIA of this article.

306

At least, it does not do so in terms corresponding to the Model Penal Code definition, unless the recklessness is
so extreme as to supply malice. See infra notes 312-13 and accompanying text.

307

See American Law Institute, Model Penal Code §§ 210.2-210.4 (1962); Tex. Penal Code §§ 19.02, 19.04-19.05
(Vernon 2005).

308

See supra note 306.

309

See supra Pt. IIB of this article.
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involuntary manslaughter if it is of a lesser degree amounting to gross negligence.310 This sharp
falloff—all the way from murder to a relatively minor offense defined only by gross negligence,
with no offense in between these two extremes—leaves a concealed gap in the Pennsylvania
pattern of homicide.
This gap, in fact, may explain the anomalous results in California’s dog-mauling cases.
In People v. Berry,311 for example, where the defendant caused the brutal death of a two-year old
by setting up a dog bred for killing to guard his marijuana plants, he did not act with mere
negligence. Even “criminal” negligence, defined to require a “substantial and unjustified risk”
and a “gross deviation” from ordinary conduct, seems inadequate to describe his culpability.
Negligence and criminal negligence in Berry both depend on objective standards, and they can
be made out by foolish inadvertence.312 The crime in Berry was not one of inadvertence.
Instead, Berry acted with full subjective awareness of the risk he created, while knowing the
substantial and unjustified quantum of that risk. This kind of recklessness is distinct and more
culpable than criminal negligence exhibited by inadvertence.313 But States such as California,
under the Pennsylvania pattern, do not recognize recklessness in the form of subjective
awareness, or actual knowledge of a substantial and unjustified risk, as a mental state separate
from gross negligence, unless the mens rea is so extreme that it supplies the malice for murder.314
It is natural in cases of this kind for a prosecutor to seek a charge more serious than
negligence. Since murder is the next rung on the ladder in California, and since depraved-heart
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malice leaves room for it, a prosecutor’s natural instinct will lead to a stretch for that next rung,
however ill-fitting the label of murder may appear in such a case. It is understandable, then, for
a trial judge to read the law as permitting this stretch, and it is equally understandable for a court
of appeals, seeing no middle alternative to reduction to a mere negligence crime, to approve the
stretch to murder as the appellate judges did in Berry.315 And then, it is at least forgivable, even
if not commendable, for a higher court to do what the California Supreme Court did in Berry: to
deny review, leaving the reinstatement of the murder indictment in place, but at the same time to
order the appellate court’s reasoning retroactively unpublished, so that the law is left completely
opaque.316 Then, finally, it is predictable that a jury given binding legal instructions and a
reasonable-doubt standard will produce only a negligence verdict, which then must be reviewed
on appeal under ambiguous doctrine—again, as happened in Berry.317
It should be added that this murder-skip-to-negligence gap is a practical, real-world
effect, not a theoretical one. It is not apparent from the face of the California statutes. In theory,
there is no gap; an unlawful homicide is either murder or manslaughter, and it is murder if the
defendant is subjectively aware and manslaughter otherwise. But the world is rarely so precise
in fitting theory, and a factfinder subject to a reasonable doubt standard is likely to balk at
convicting a defendant for murder when there is neither intent nor knowledge, as in Berry.
Hence, the practical effect is that very serious homicides (which describes Berry even in the
absence of intent or knowledge) are shoved down to the level of mere negligence, an outcome
that depreciates their blameworthiness. Again, this effect is not an intended or theoretical result
in California, but it is real nonetheless. It results from the absence of a separate crime below
315

Berry v. Superior Court, 256 Cal. Rptr. 344 (1989) (ordered not published; previously published at 208
Cal.App.3d 783).
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murder but above mere negligence, that a crime might cover cases such as Berry, such as the
subjective-awareness reckless manslaughter offense in Texas.
Earlier, this article critiqued the Pennsylvania pattern’s definition of depraved-heart
murder in connection with Berry.318 The present discussion adds another criticism, centering on
the discontinuity produced when the law creates no alternative below murder except criminal
negligence. A conscious-indifference crime as a lesser-included offense makes sense in light of
the results illustrated by Berry. There may be an understandable historical reason for the failure
of Pennsylvania-pattern States to define such a homicidal crime, since the conscious indifference
or similar mental state required for abandoned-heart murder would remain confusingly similar to
the conscious indifference required for recklessness.319

Lawmakers conceivably could

distinguish malice-type conscious indifference by some sort of pejorative label such as
“extreme,” but that adjective seems an illogical qualifier for a categorical mental state such as
conscious indifference.320 This term, quite properly, is useful precisely to convey an either-it-isor-it isn’t condition: knowledge or awareness that the defendant either does or does not possess,
with degrees such as “extreme” consciousness seeming anomalous. Thus, it is understandable
that the Pennsylvania pattern leads to the absence of an intermediate crime. At the same time,
however, the failure to include that intermediate crime produces a gap that prevents proportional
crime grading. Under the Model Penal Code, the gap disappears: manslaughter covers the
conscious-indifference case (recklessness), while criminally negligent homicide covers
inadvertence (gross-deviation negligence).
2.

Vagueness in the Definition of Involuntary Manslaughter
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Aside from this coverage discontinuity, the definition of lesser included offenses under
the Pennsylvania pattern sometimes produces unnecessary vagueness. One disadvantage of the
California jurisprudence, for example, is that the jury should be given the statutory definition,
including the “without due care and circumspection” provision, which implies that ordinary
negligence suffices and therefore conflicts with the higher requirement, tantamount to gross
negligence, imposed by the case law. This problem parallels the issues raised by the malice
aforethought criterion discussed in a previous section of this article.321 It probably is not a
source of injustice if the jury is successfully educated about the contradiction and inculcated with
the true meaning of the crime, but it still remains a source of unnecessary confusion that requires
attention and may divert the jury from other issues—as well as a potential source of erroneous
conviction, in those cases in which the jury might remain confused. And this confusion, again,
cumulates with other contradictions, such as those created by instant premeditation and the
misnomer of malice aforethought.
Another problem arises from confusion in the judicial redefinition of the statutory
formula. As sometimes happens when the legislative language is so ill-fitting that it must be
interpreted extensively,322 the California courts have produced inconsistent and varying
translations of the “without due care and circumspection” requirement for involuntary
manslaughter. The prevailing definitions emphasize that the standard is objective, so that an
inadvertent defendant, who is unaware of or has forgotten the risk, can still be guilty of the crime
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See supra notes 199-204 and accompanying text.
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“[O]ur law recognizes that ordinary negligence is a common occurrence in human affairs, and that even when
such commonplace heedlessness proves lethal, its criminalization would be undesirable for a number of reasons
including fairness, social utility, and the hazards of granting excessive discretion to prosecuting authorities to
capriciously punish where there is little if any ground for moral blame or social opprobrium.” People v. Gilbert,
2004 WL 2416533 at 3 (Cal. App.) (unpublished opinion). Thus, the statutory language, “without due care,”
furnishes an inadequate standard.
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if this inadvertence results in conduct that is a gross deviation from that of an ordinary person.323
In other words, “pure heart, empty head”324 does not avoid criminal liability. But there are some
decisions that seem to suggest otherwise, implying instead that actual awareness of the risk is
required.325 Furthermore, the California cases use so many different terms to define the mens rea
for involuntary manslaughter, each with different connotations, that confusion seems
inevitable.326
The following passage from a recent unpublished opinion in a case called People v.
Gilbert shows a prototypical treatment of the issue:327
The phrase " 'without due caution and circumspection' " means that the
defendant's conduct must be criminally negligent. The Penal Code defines
"negligence" using a variation of the familiar concept of lack of due care, i.e., "a
want of such attention to the nature or probable consequences of the act or
omission as a prudent man ordinarily bestows in acting in his own concerns."
However, criminal negligence sufficient to establish manslaughter requires
"something more" than the "mere negligence" or "ordinary negligence" that leads
to civil liability. " 'The negligence must be aggravated, culpable, gross, or
reckless, that is, the conduct of the accused must be such a departure from what
would be the conduct of an ordinarily prudent or careful man under the same
circumstances as to be incompatible with a proper regard for human life, or, in
other words, a disregard of human life or an indifference to consequences.' . . .
'Aside from the facts that a more culpable degree of negligence is required in
order to establish a criminal homicide than is required in a civil action for
damages and that contributory negligence is not a defense, criminal responsibility
for a negligent homicide is ordinarily to be determined pursuant to the general
principles of negligence, the fundamental of which is knowledge, actual or
imputed, that the act of the slayer tended to endanger life.' "
Thus, to support a conviction of involuntary manslaughter the defendant's
conduct must rise at least to the level of gross negligence, which is defined as "the
323
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exercise of so slight a degree of care as to raise a presumption of conscious
indifference to the consequences. 'The state of mind of a person who acts with
conscious indifference to the consequences is simply, "I don't care what
happens." ' "
. . . "[C]riminal negligence must be evaluated objectively. . . . The relevant
inquiry . . . turns not on defendant's subjective intent . . . but on the objective
reasonableness of her course of conduct." " 'The test is objective: whether a
reasonable person in the defendant's position would have been aware of the risk
involved'.”. . .
The reference in this passage to “conscious indifference” indicate that actual awareness, or in
other words, subjective knowledge, is required. This position is supported by authority.328 But
the reference to “objective reasonableness” indicates, on the contrary, that “subjective intent” is
not required. This contrary position also is supported by authority.329 The references to both
ordinary and gross negligence are inconsistent, even though a reader might conclude that the
passage calls for gross negligence by reading it carefully as a whole. Terms such as “aggravated,
culpable, gross, or reckless,” although they all have been used to describe criminal negligence,330
produce different meanings; in a sense, even ordinary negligence is “culpable,” even though it is
not “aggravated.”
The same case, Gilbert, demonstrates the kinds of arguments that
confusion.

result from this

The defendant had left his son, Kyle, in his automobile, where Kyle died of

hypothermia. Defendant contended “that he [could not] be guilty of criminal negligence because
he forgot that Kyle was locked in the car.” In other words, “without an actual present knowledge
328
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It should be added that the distinction between recklessness (which requires actual, subjective awareness of the
risk) and criminal negligence (which does not, but rather can be supplied by mere inadvertence) is inherently
confusing. Undoubtedly, Texas juries must have difficulty with the distinction too. But the confusion is reduced in
Texas in that the two terms, recklessness and criminal negligence, are used separately and distinctly, and the
difference is explained precisely. In summary, the confusion cannot be dispelled perfectly in the real world, but it
can be reduced.
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that Kyle was in the car, he could not be charged with knowledge that Kyle was at risk.”331 The
court rejected this argument as “incompatible with the principles we have just recited.” The
“governing question,” it held, is “the objective reasonableness of [defendant’s] course of
conduct.” This standard depended not only upon circumstances “of which the defendant is
presently, actively aware,” but also upon “all of the circumstances of which a reasonable person
would be aware.”332 Having thus founded its decision on an objective standard, however, the
court went on to confuse the matter by injecting a subjective standard. Gilbert’s conduct, it said,
reflected a “conscious disregard of the lethal risk he had created,” and “[n]othing more was
required to sustain a finding of guilt.”333

A “conscious disregard” requires an awareness

(consciousness) of the risks that the defendant disregards, and this passage is flatly inconsistent
with other parts of the opinion saying that awareness is not required.
This confusion carries over into jury instructions. “Routine” charges in involuntary
manslaughter cases include the statement that, for criminal negligence, “it must . . . appear that
death was not the result if inattention, mistake in judgment[,] or misadventure[,] but the natural
and probable cause of [an] aggravated[,] reckless[,] or grossly negligent act.”334 This instruction
conflicts directly with the Gilbert holding, which enables “inattention” or “mistake” to be
sufficient, and it also creates confusion when combined with instructions embodying an
objective negligence standard.335 The Gilbert jury also was instructed that “[m]ere inattention,
forgetfulness, mistake in judgment, or misadventure . . . is not criminal unless the quality of the
act makes it so.” Understandably, the jury sent an inquiry during deliberations asking about the
331
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meaning of the cryptic phrase, “unless the quality of the act makes it so.”336 This key language
provided the exception that allowed conviction.
Again, the presence of large proportions of unpublished cases suggests that this kind of
confusion produces appeals that would otherwise be unnecessary.337 A Lexis search showed
that nine of the ten most recent cases on point are unpublished and uncitable.338 Juries, lawyers,
and courts probably would understand the standard better if the Model Penal Code formulation
were used. Ideally, this solution would be accomplished by legislation such as that in Texas,
enacting both a more serious offense characterized by actual knowledge of the risk
(manslaughter) and a lesser offense requiring only conduct that is grossly negligent by objective
standards (negligent homicide). Short of this kind of legislation, however, the California courts
should follow the example of the Model Penal Code at least to an extent that avoids confusing
the proper objective standard with subjective formulations such as “conscious indifference.”
IV.

FELONY MURDER: STATUTORY DEFINITION
VERSUS COMMON LAW EVOLUTION

The felony murder rule, stated simplistically, defines as murder a killing caused by a
defendant in the course of committing a felony, even if the mens rea for murder would otherwise
be absent.339 At common law, a rough definition probably sufficed, because not only murder but
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other felonies as well were punishable by death, and therefore the details did not matter as much
as they do today.340 Contemporary jurisprudence seeks to limit the felony murder doctrine,
however, because it might disconnect results from blameworthiness if applied to the outer edges
of this rough definition.341 Jurisdictions differ primarily in the doctrines that they use for limiting
the felony murder rule.342
Some scholars who criticize the felony murder rule conclude that there is little in the way
of policy that supports it.343 The most frequent attacks against the doctrine are that it allegedly
creates a crime that does not correspond to the defendant’s individual blameworthiness, that it is
artificial and formal, and that it cannot serve its supposed purposes.344 These criticisms are useful
for evaluating different formulations of felony murder, even in jurisdictions that do not abolish it.
In other writing elsewhere, I have argued that the felony murder rule does serve important
purposes and that the limits that differing States have imposed upon it are consistent with those
purposes, because they prevent the rule from applying to cases in which it does not serve its
function.345 The policies underlying the felony murder rule, as I have explained them, are that it
contributes to rational classification and proportional grading of homicides, because actus reus,
Thus, California also recognizes a separate category of “first-degree felony murder.” The reader will recall that
California creates a number of situation-specific first-degree murder definitions, including murders committed
during “arson, rape, carjacking, robbery, burglary, mayhem, kidnapping, train wrecking, or any other act punishable
under [certain other statutes].” This provision has the effect of dispensing with any requirement of premeditation or
deliberation as well as all other mental-state requirements except those required for the underlying felonies, and also
of elevating the crime to first-degree murder. See LEVENSON § 5:17 (explaining this doctrine).
340
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as well as mens rea, is relevant to blameworthiness;346 that it serves the function of
condemnation, by reaffirming the sanctity of human life;347 that it serves a deterrent function;348
that it enhances the clarity of crime definition and sentencing consequences that flow from
crimes;349 that it contributes to the proper allocation of scarce criminal justice resources;350 and
that it minimizes the utility of perjury.351 Here, I shall not repetitively develop the arguments
supporting these purposes or the contrary arguments, although that is a matter for continuing
debate and could be the subject of a complete article by itself.352 Instead, this article will use
345
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these policies—those identified by both critics and supporters of the rule—as the basis for
comparing the Texas and California versions of felony murder, on the assumption that, since
most jurisdictions have retained the felony murder doctrine, the issue whether to retain the rule is
separate from the question whether one formulation is superior to another.
The California felony murder doctrine is not expressed in the statutes. The relevant
language simply defines murder as a killing with “malice aforethought,” and because that term
derives from the common law, and because the common law included the felony murder rule as
an aspect of implied malice,353 the California courts initially retained and applied a court-defined
version of the rule. The California Supreme Court later held, however, that “malice is not an
element . . . under the felony-murder doctrine,” and that the rule in that State arose instead by
more general implication from the legislative history of the murder statute.354 In fact, People v.
Dillon,355 which announces this holding, is emblematic of the uncertainty in the California
statutes that is created by a history of what can only be called sloppy legislation.
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Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, The Political, Social, Psychological and Other Non-Legal
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commission that drew up the statutes repealed the predecessor provision that provided the felony
murder rule, but elsewhere the commission assumed that it had preserved the rule, and therefore,
according to the California court, “although the balance remains close,” the Commission indeed
had preserved the rule, by its expression of intent to do so. “It no longer matters whether the
Commission may have [been mistaken]; what matters is (1) the Commission apparently believed
that its version of section 189 codified the felony-murder rule . . . , and (2) the legislature
adopted section 189 in the form proposed by the Commission.”356 Although Dillon is well
written, the need for this kind of roundabout reasoning to discover something so controversial as
the felony-murder doctrine, in the hidden crevices of a statute whose language has no relation to
it, speaks volumes about the haphazardness of California’s homicide jurisprudence.
Furthermore, in later decisions, the court has reverted to referring to felony murder as derived
from imputed malice.357 This vacillation matters, because pattern jury instructions suggest
omitting malice in felony murder cases, and it would be nice, to say the least, if such a basic
issue were made clear so that trial judges could accurately instruct juries.358
In accordance with the common law, the California court has limited the second-degree
felony murder doctrine in two major ways: by a dangerousness requirement359 and by what is
called the merger or lesser-included-offense rule.360 (The rule also is limited in other ways,
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notably by causation elements361 and by restrictions on vicarious liability,362 but these issues are
beyond the scope of this article.363) Because these limits are developed in California on an
ongoing basis by judges of differing philosophies, they are neither fully explained nor
consistent.364
Texas, by way of contrast, defines its felony murder doctrine in a statute adopted by the
legislature, which provides that an actor commits murder if he or she365
commits or attempts to commit a felony, other than manslaughter, and in the
course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempt, or in immediate flight
from the commission or attempt, he commits or attempts to commit an act clearly
dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual.
As does California, Texas thus provides multiple ways to commit murder. This article has
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California has not required a “strict causal relationship” between the felony and the death, but only requires that
the death occur “in the perpetration” of the felony or attempt and as part of a “continuous transaction.” See People
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already discussed two of three Texas murder types: murder committed intentionally or
knowingly, and murder committed with an intent to cause serious bodily injury, coupled with an
act clearly dangerous to human life.366 The provision discussed here adds felony murder as the
third method of committing the crime. And as does California, Texas limits felony murder by a
dangerousness element and by a merger or lesser-included offense doctrine.367 The two States
differ significantly, however, in their definitions of these limits. Therefore, this article now turns
to an analysis of these two issues—dangerousness requirements and merger—to compare the
California and Texas provisions with each other, as well as to consider how well they achieve the
ostensible purposes of the felony murder doctrine.
A. The Dangerousness Criterion: Should There Be a Requirement of an “Inherently
Dangerous Felony,” or of an “Act Clearly Dangerous to Human Life”?
1.

California’s “Inherently Dangerous Felony” Approach

The California felony murder doctrine, by court evolution, includes the requirement of an
“inherently dangerous felony.” It is the felony defined by the applicable law that matters, viewed
in the abstract and without reference to the individual acts of the defendant in committing it.368
Thus, a death produced accidentally in the course of grand theft is not felony murder, even if the
defendant had acted in a manner outrageously risky to the life of the victim,369 and conversely, a
robbery or arson that accidentally produces a homicide can be felony murder even if the
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defendant has done nothing particularly dangerous.370 The rule operates by considering the
category of felony, not the case facts.
This inherently-dangerous-felony approach has produced some anomalous results. In
People v. Satchell,371 for example, the California Supreme Court held that the felony of
possession of a sawed-off shotgun by a previously convicted felon was not “inherently
dangerous,” notwithstanding the fact that, in this case, the defendant pointed the illegal firearm at
an individual and discharged it. This conclusion followed the court’s reasoning that the category
of felony was to be viewed “in the abstract,” or in other words, without regard to the particular
facts of the case.372 Furthermore, the court reasoned that the elements of possession of an illegal
weapon by a felon could be committed in ways that were not dangerous to life.373 This reasoning
seems dubious, because most non-homicidal felonies, including robbery and arson, also can be
committed in ways that are not particularly dangerous to life: by a stronger robber, for example,
who holds a weaker person down while taking her purse, or by an arsonist who burns a building
known to be unoccupied. Thus, the Satchell reasoning would destroy all felony murder reasoning
if applied consistently, although that is not what the California courts have done, of course.
Furthermore, one might critique Satchell by hypothesizing that the California legislature had a
purpose in mind in prohibiting felons from possessing sawed-off shotguns, and the probable
purpose was to prevent behavior (namely felons’ possession of dangerous weapons without
lawful uses) that the legislature must have considered . . . well, . . . “inherently dangerous”!
Actually, the court recognized this hypothesis in Satchell. “An ex-felon by his felony
370
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conviction has demonstrated instability and a propensity for crime. Thus, there is a core of logic
in the assumption that if such a person arms himself with a concealable weapon he commits a
crime per se dangerous to human life.”374 The court then proceeded, however, to reject this
“core of logic.” “[O]ne cannot logically achieve this conclusion that such person [a felon], when
he arms himself, commits a crime inherently dangerous to human life, unless it also be shown
that one who so demonstrates instability and propensity for crime is inherently disposed toward
acts dangerous to human life.”375 A possible response to this logic is, “Huh!? I thought that was
exactly why the legislature made it a felony for ‘such person’ to ‘arm himself’ this way!”
Furthermore, in Satchell, the court reached its result only by overruling several of its
prior decisions, in which it had held precisely the opposite: that a felon’s possession of an illegal
weapon was, indeed, a crime inherently dangerous to human life.376 “At the outset, it is clear
that this court has unequivocally held on more than one occasion that the offense of [felon in
possession] is a felony capable of supporting a second-degree felony murder instruction.”377 The
court then cited no fewer than four then-recent decisions in which it had so held.378 The court
explained its overruling of those decisions only by reference to dictum that disfavored the felony
murder rule as “highly artificial” and that concluded that it should not be “extended.”379 Unlike
other courts, the California court made no attempt to point to any “special” factor that would
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justify such a deviation from stare decisis.380 This chain of flip-flops stands in sharp contrast to
decisions in States such as Minnesota, which has upheld the use of the felony murder rule in
closely similar circumstances involving possession of an illegal firearm by a felon.381 The
Satchell reasoning shows the kind of unpredictability that suggests that differences in result are
nothing but political reflections of judge’s preferences. Satchell thus makes a strong case for
clear statutory definition of such a longstanding and broadly applicable doctrine as the felony
murder rule, rather than the kind of casual, tack-and-weave jurisprudence produced by a fickle
judiciary. A policy question of this kind should be resolved by the political process, in the
legislature, not by changing judicial judgments about whether a rule followed by virtually all
American jurisdictions is “artificial” and therefore disfavored.382
More recently, the California court held in People v. Hansen383 that the felony of “willful
discharge of a firearm at an inhabited dwelling” was inherently dangerous. The underlying
felony of discharging a firearm into an “inhabited” dwelling was defined so that it could be
committed even if no occupants were present, and for that matter, even if the perpetrator had
assured himself that no one was at home.384 Thus, the predicate felony was capable of being
completed without danger to anyone, just as the crime of possession by a felon of an illegal
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weapon was in Satchell. Nevertheless, without overruling Satchell, and without disapproving its
reasoning, the court upheld the conviction of a defendant who shot at a residence and
unintentionally killed a thirteen-year-old girl who lived there:385
. . . In firing a gun at such a structure, there always will exist a significant
likelihood that an occupant may be present. Although it is true that a defendant
may be guilty of this felony even if, at the time of the shooting, the residents of
the inhabited dwelling happen to be absent, the offense nonetheless is one that,
viewed in the abstract—as shooting at a structure that currently is used for
dwelling purposes—poses a great risk or "high probability" of death within the
meaning of [prior decisional law]. The nature of the other acts proscribed by [the
statute] reinforces the conclusion that the Legislature viewed the offense of
discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling as posing a risk of death
comparable to that involved in shooting at an occupied building or motor vehicle.
Furthermore, application of the second degree felony-murder rule to a
homicide resulting from a violation of [this statute] directly would serve the
fundamental rationale of the felony-murder rule—the deterrence of negligent or
accidental killings in the course of the commission of dangerous felonies. . . .
In reaching this conclusion, the court did not consider its earlier dictum disfavoring the felony
murder rule as “artificial” or refusing to “extend” it. The approach of avoiding that dictum
seems appropriate.

Considering the rationale of a doctrine and attempting to follow the

legislative intent will normally provide superior reasoning, as opposed to relying on vague
indications of disfavor unrelated to the statutory policy, which provide little structure for either
applying or not applying the doctrine in a given case.
Justice Mosk dissented in Hansen, on the arguable ground that the result was inconsistent
with the court’s precedents,386 as well as with the more dubious suggestion that a proper
predicate felony must be one from which death, in any given instance, is “highly probable.”387
Indeed, this was what the majority had said: the felony must be one from which death must be
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“highly probable.”388 Even robbery, rape, or arson would fail this test as predicates for felony
murder,389 because most robberies, rapes, and arsons do not result in homicides, and thus they
are not crimes from which it can be said that death is a “high probability.” The court also
referred to “a great risk” of death, for which drive-by shootings into inhabited residences may
arguably qualify,390 and it treated this phrase as the equivalent of “a high probability.” To say the
least, the reasoning in Hansen is muddled.
In fact, there simply is no consistency whatsoever in the California court’s distinctions of
crimes that are inherently dangerous from those that are not. Here is the court’s own list of its
holdings, from its 2005 decision in People v. Howard:391
Felonies that have been held inherently dangerous to life include shooting at
an inhabited dwelling; poisoning with intent to injure; arson of a motor vehicle;
grossly negligent discharge of a firearm; manufacturing methamphetamine;
kidnapping; and reckless or malicious possession of a destructive device.
Felonies that have been held not inherently dangerous to life include
practicing medicine without a license under conditions creating a risk of great
bodily harm, serious physical or mental illness, or death; false imprisonment by
violence, menace, fraud, or deceit; possession of a concealable firearm by a
convicted felon; possession of a sawed-off shotgun; escape; grand theft;
conspiracy to possess methedrine; furnishing phencyclidine; and child
endangerment or abuse.
It is difficult to see why recklessly possessing a destructive device is “inherently dangerous”
while intentional possession of a concealed weapon by a felon (or possession of a sawed-off
shotgun) is not. Likewise, it is unclear why manufacturing methamphetamine is inherently
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dangerous while furnishing phencyclidine is not. And what policy determines that “grossly
negligent discharge of a firearm” is inherently dangerous, while (intentionally) practicing
medicine without a license “under conditions creating a risk of great bodily harm, serious
physical or mental illness, or death” is not? These are decisions reached without any basic
rationale, and worse yet, with no respect for legislative classifications.392
In fact, in Howard, the predicate felony was that of “eluding a pursuing police officer
[by] driving in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property.”393 The
requirement of “willful or wanton disregard for . . . safety” might well alert a court that the
legislature considers the defined felony to be “dangerous.” The Howard majority, however,
declined to follow this indication of legislative intent and instead found an absence of inherent
dangerousness in the essentially arbitrary way in which it had done so in the past: by referring to
felony murder as “artificial” and as “deserving no extension beyond its required application,”
without doing any meaningful analysis of the proper “required application” of the rule.394
Two justices dissented in Howard. It can be argued that both were closer to the mark
than the majority. Justice Baxter looked to the definition of the offense, which, as he put it, is
“inherently dangerous [because] it creates a substantial risk that someone will be killed.”395
Furthermore, Justice Baxter would have considered the defendant’s actual conduct: “[T]here is
no doubt that the defendant [in this case] committed exactly the reckless endangerment of human
392
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life forbidden by the statute.”396 This approach imports a “dangerous act” or “totality of the
circumstances” test, which would look to more than the “abstract” felony: arguably, a more
promising approach.397 Justice Brown’s analysis was more radical, although she “agree[d] with
Justice Baxter that if any offense should easily qualify as inherently dangerous, [this offense]
certainly would.”398 She noted that all three courts of appeals that had considered the question
had agreed with the “inherently dangerous” label, and she concluded that the California court’s
approach “suggest[ed] a level of arbitrariness we should make every effort to eliminate from the
criminal law.”399 Justice Brown’s solution: “I would abrogate the second-degree felony murder
rule and leave it to the Legislature to define precisely what conduct subjects a defendant to strict
criminal liability.”400 Although it is doubtful that the court itself should have abolished a
doctrine that, although judicial in origin, has received such longstanding legislative
acquiescence, Justice Brown’s suggestion for more precise legislative definition should sound a
clarion call to the California legislature.
The problem, it is submitted, lies in California’s “inherently dangerous felony” test. The
term is vague enough so that most felonies will require ad hoc adjudication to determine whether
they qualify. And the results do not seem likely to reflect the policies supporting the felony
murder rule as they are hypothesized above.401 In Satchell, for example, where a previously
convicted felon possessed an illegal weapon and pointed and discharged it at a human being, the
395
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policies of reflecting grades of blameworthiness, condemning the taking of human life, deterring
outrageously dangerous conduct by felons, as well as other arguable policies, seem to support
invocation of the felony murder rule, assuming, of course, that those policies are validly
hypothesized.402 And the analysis of the drive-by shooting in Hansen, preoccupied as it was with
the possibility that the crime of shooting into a residence could theoretically be committed in a
safe and sound manner, seems to have very little to do with the reasons for having a felony
murder doctrine, even if Hansen is considered correct in upholding its application to the
particular felony at issue.
2.

The “Dangerous Act” Approach: Is It a Better Way?

Perhaps a sounder way to use the dangerousness element to limit the felony murder
doctrine is to require the jury to focus instead on the defendant’s actions in the particular case.
Perhaps, in other words, the dangerousness limit would perform its function of keeping the
felony murder rule consistent with its policies if the crime were defined in terms of the
dangerousness of the individual defendant’s conduct, rather than by reference to the felony
viewed “in the abstract.” The Texas statute accomplishes this purpose by requiring not only a
predicate felony, but also “an act” by the individual defendant in the particular case that is
“clearly dangerous to human life.”403 Through this language, the Texas statute offers an answer
to critics who argue that the felony murder doctrine separates guilt from blameworthiness.404
Individual blameworthiness is a statutory element of the crime, at least to the extent that the law
requires objective dangerousness “clearly” manifested by this individual’s actions during a
felony. Inconsistent rhetoric and dubious results in defining inherently dangerous felonies are
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not necessary under this dangerousness limit. The Texas statute thus seems to succeed better than
the California approach in carrying out the policies of crime grading corresponding to
blameworthiness, condemnation of actions that take human life, deterrence of conduct that
creates a risk of death during commission of a felony, and other purposes that can be
hypothesized in support of the felony murder doctrine.405 The California legislature should hear
Justice Brown’s message, and it can make sense of the dangerousness limit by defining felony
murder to require a “clearly dangerous” act by the individual defendant.
B. “Merger”: A Sound Doctrine, but One Capable of Unsound Application
1.

California’s “Bootstrapping” and “Independent Felonious Purpose”
Doctrines

Another limit commonly found in the felony murder doctrines of the various States is
called “merger.”406 The simplest example involves lesser included homicides, of which the most
illustrative is manslaughter. Without a limit on the use of manslaughter as a predicate felony, a
murder conviction could be obtained by proof otherwise sufficing only for manslaughter, by the
straightforward (if dubious) reasoning that manslaughter is itself a felony. It is dangerous, and it
causes death. The unvarnished felony murder rule therefore converts all manslaughters,
automatically, into murders.407 This reasoning, of course, conflicts with the crime-grading
system created by the legislature in defining the crime of manslaughter in the first place. It also
violates the usual rule of statutory construction, that all language and all provisions passed by the
legislature are supposed to have some sort of meaning. Therefore, most jurisdictions have
inferred a limit: the murder that otherwise would result from the felony murder doctrine is
“merged” into the lesser included crime, if the lesser offense is all that is supported by the
405
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evidence.408
This example, however, is only the beginning. Many jurisdictions apply the merger
limitation to crimes other than manslaughter. California, for example, applies the doctrine to
assaultive offenses, holding that they cannot support felony murder. In People v. Ireland,409 the
California court explained its application of the merger doctrine to assaults by concluding that
murder convictions based upon assault would amount to “bootstrapping.” The court reasoned
that “the felony murder rule would effectively preclude the jury from considering the issue of
malice aforethought in all cases wherein homicide has been committed as a result of a felonious
assault—a category which includes the great majority of all homicides.”410 This reasoning, in
turn, has required the courts in California to sort out which crimes are sufficiently assault-like to
require merger. What about assault that is not merely assault, but that qualifies for the more
serious label of assault with a deadly weapon?411 Or, for a more challenging example, what about
discharging a firearm into an inhabited building, as in the Hansen drive-by shooting case
discussed in the previous section?412 Applying felony murder to Hansen would “effectively
preclude the jury from considering malice aforethought” in an assault-like case, exactly as in
Ireland. The California court, however, distinguished Ireland by reasoning that a drive-by
shooting involves an independent felonious purpose, separate from the assaultive conduct it may
involve:413
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. . . [T]he merger rule [is] inapplicable [when] the defendant [has] exhibited a
collateral and independent felonious design that [is] separate from the resulting
homicide. [W]e [have] held that where the underlying felony is committed with a
design collateral to, or independent of, an intent to cause injury that would result
in death, “[g]iving a felony-murder instruction in such a situation serves rather
than subverts the purpose of the rule.”. . .
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the offense of discharging a
firearm at an inhabited dwelling house does not “merge” with a resulting
homicide . . . , and therefore that this offense will support a conviction of second
degree felony.
In the same passage, however, the California court also declined to accept the independent
felonious design theory. Even if Hansen is correctly decided, this reasoning is unsatisfying. It is
difficult to perceive any “independent felonious purpose,” apart from the purpose of shooting
into a building, that is to be found in the unitary act of shooting into a building. But without it,
Ireland is difficult to distinguish. Perhaps the answer is that Ireland, which applies the merger
doctrine to assaults, is wrongly decided. The courts of other States as diverse as Georgia414 and
Minnesota415 have refused to follow California’s example and have instead predicated the felony
murder doctrine on assaults.
Another issue is presented by burglaries that include assaultive elements. In People v.
Wilson,416 the California Supreme Court applied the merger doctrine to bar the use of burglary
with intent to commit assault as a predicate for felony murder. The court used “bootstrapping”
reasoning similar to that in Ireland to conclude that the merger doctrine applied.417 The court did
not view the crime of burglary as containing an independent felonious purpose or ingredient,
even though the entry into the victim’s residence that made out the burglary was arguably an
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independent ingredient.418 Hansen, which was resolved on grounds of independent felonious
purpose,419 was decided after Wilson, but seems inconsistent with it; if one can see an
“independent felonious purpose” in a drive-by shooting that results in death, it seems even more
persuasive to argue that the defendant’s own armed entry into the victim’s residence can supply
such an independent purpose or ingredient. Furthermore, the purposes of the felony murder rule
seem to be carried out by applying the rule to a case like Wilson, especially to the extent that the
underlying policies include the grading of crimes to correspond to their blameworthiness and
severity. New York has pointedly disagreed with the merger argument in Wilson by observing
that burglaries of residences involve a high risk of violence.420 The majority of States, in fact,
follow the New York approach.421
2.

Texas’s Statutory Approach

The Texas statute, in sharp contrast to the reasoning of the California court, identifies
only one felony that is subject to merger: manslaughter.422 Texas thus avoids the anomaly in
Wilson of applying merger to a killing during a burglary.423 But there are other anomalies. First,
what about assaultive killings? The statute does not clearly resolve the issue. At first, the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals inferred a merger bar as a matter of statutory construction, as
California did in Ireland, to prevent the use of assault as a predicate felony for murder.424 Later,
recognizing that the text of the statute conflicted with this application of merger, the Texas court
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overruled itself and allowed felony murder to be based on aggravated assault.425 Today in Texas,
in other words, if one feloniously assaults another person but inadvertently goes too far and kills
the victim, the felony murder doctrine can apply.
This result is subject to the criticism that prompted the California court to bar assault as a
predicate felony by invoking the merger doctrine in Ireland. The assault that the perpetrator
commits is one course of conduct with the murder, and the “bootstrapping” argument that the
court there invoked seems to apply.426 As a matter of policy, however, basing felony murder on
aggravated assault does not necessarily derogate from the goal of matching offense grades to
blameworthiness. Felony assault, in Texas, is not made out by just any assault; there is a lesser
offense of simple assault.427 The felony of aggravated assault requires an additional element:428
the infliction of “serious bodily injury,” defined to mean protracted loss of use of a bodily
member or organ,429 or the use of a deadly weapon. Thus, the defendant who pleads
bootstrapping is advancing an unappealing claim. The argument sounds like this: “Yes, I shot the
victim (or yes, I ran over him, or bashed his head in with a pool cue), but I only meant to maim
(or to severely injure, or make a paraplegic out of) him. Gosh, I guess I overdid it and killed him,
but I shouldn’t be guilty of murder!” As is indicated above, a number of other States base felony
murder on assaults.430 Furthermore, so did the common law, which held that intent to cause
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serious injury supplied malice aforethought, if it resulted in death in fact.431 This principle was
not a part of the felony murder doctrine but furnished a separate kind of common law malice. In
reading its murder statute to bar felonious assaults that result in death from supporting felony
murder, the California Supreme Court arguably violated one of its own frequent rules of
statutory construction, which calls for the court to interpret statutory terms that derive from the
common law in accordance with the common law.432
But there are other inferable results that could possibly follow from the Texas statute that
would not be so easily defended. For example, the crime of negligent homicide433 is a “felony
other than manslaughter,” and it therefore might be considered as a predicate felony under the
literal statutory language. Although negligent homicide is a felony in Texas today, it was a
misdemeanor434 at the time that the “felony other than manslaughter” language was adopted, and
this history may explain the evident legislative oversight that created this possibility. But using
negligent homicide in this manner would violate the legislative intent for the same reasons that
using manslaughter would. Therefore the Texas court has barred its use as a matter of
construction, by a holding that extends to “lesser included offenses” of manslaughter.435 The
431
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anomaly thus disappears as a result of judicial interpretation.
Another controversial issue—one that persists—concerns felony murder based on the
predicate crime of endangerment or injury to a child. As is indicated above, California disallows
the use of child abuse felonies as a basis.436 Texas, however, allows it.437 Arguments about
merger that distinguish “independent felonious purpose” from “bootstrapping,”438 as in
California, would lead to the result that California in fact reaches: a conclusion that, since the act
constituting the felony of child abuse is an integral part of the course of conduct causing death by
child abuse, felony murder is barred by merger.439 The different Texas result, however, can be
based both on different statutory language and on policy arguments. Texas’s crime of injury to a
child440 is defined differently from manslaughter, with entirely different ingredients, and it is not
a lesser included offense.441

Since the text of the felony-murder statute excludes only

manslaughter as a predicate, fidelity to the legislation is arguably advanced by allowing injury to
a child to serve as a predicate. Furthermore, the purpose of child-endangerment or -injury
statutes, as separate enactments from assaultive provisions applicable to adult victims reflects the
policy justifications for felony murder. The vulnerability of children of the covered ages and
their dependence on adults are a part of this purpose. Another part is the tendency of injuries to
children to be based on long-duration cycles of repeated abuse in residential settings that are
inaccessible to others. Finally, yet another part of the policy is the difficulty of proving which
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actor among two or more has injured a child, even when the child is unmistakably known to have
been abused.442 This difficulty is aggravated by the clandestine nature of the crime and by
privileges443 that prevent testimony from those most likely to know about it.

These

considerations arguably support the approach of allowing felony murder to be predicated on
child-abuse felonies.
The consequences of the Texas statute do not end there, however. The statute provides
that the felony of injury to a child can be committed not only intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly, but also with “criminal negligence,” which is negligence involving a “gross
deviation” from ordinary conduct.444 Therefore, if it is used as the basis of felony murder, this
crime creates a species of murder for which the mens rea may be no more serious than gross
inadvertence. The Texas court, in fact, has upheld murder convictions based on injury to
children supported by instructions permitting criminal negligence to suffice.445 Should this rule
of law be maintained?

Actually, California allows negligence-based offenses to serve as

predicates for murder,446 and thus this Texas result is not unusual. The Texas cases thus far
generally seem to have involved caregivers of children who have killed them under egregious
442
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facts.447 The cases appear, in other words, to carry out the policies discussed above.
But what of a case not involving a caregiver: for example, a case involving a child killed
in an outrageously careless traffic accident by an “act clearly dangerous to human life” that is a
sufficiently “gross deviation” to be labeled criminal negligence?448 That sort of case does not
appear in the appellate reports, and it is tempting to conclude that felony murder would not
apply. But the Texas jurisprudence, read literally, seems to permit it. And as these words were
being written, a murder complaint was pending in Houston against a bus driver who arguably
drove his vehicle with criminal negligence so that it killed a child whom he apparently did not
see. The theory of the charge was felony murder, with criminally negligent injury to a child as
the predicate. It seems doubtful that this charge was consistent with the legislative intent, and
arguably this is one area in which the California law is clearer and more consistent with felony
murder policies than the Texas law. The smart money, however, is on a holding by the Texas
courts that applies merger to this situation, and one might guess that this anomaly in Texas may
disappear.

In fact, the grand jury indicted the bus driver only for manslaughter, after the

prosecutor presented the case as one of recklessness—subjective awareness of a high risk of
death reflected in outrageously dangerous conduct—instead of a felony murder case.449 Texas’s
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authorization of felony murder based on injury to a child may nevertheless remain arguably
justified in terms of statutory interpretation and policy if the courts prevent it in cases such as the
bus driver’s, and the question that then would persist would be whether the Texas jurisprudence,
with its stronger condemnation of killings of children, is superior to California’s approach.
CONCLUSION
The Pennsylvania pattern creates a messy jurisprudence. When one finds judicial
decisions holding that malice is not an element of a particular kind of murder, and coexisting
with those decisions one also finds decisions in the same jurisdiction holding, on the contrary,
that malice is an essential element, something is wrong.450 And the contradiction matters,
because trial judges cannot possibly know, in the most basic way, what to say to juries in their
instructions. When this sort of flip-flop persists over decades, in multiple opinions, one wonders
how jury verdicts or court opinions can possibly maintain any fidelity to the State’s
jurisprudence. Then, when one also sees that the legislature has repealed a certain definition of
murder, but that it remains in place because the state supreme court assumes that the legislature
did not intend to do what it did but instead intended to preserve the particular version of murder
even as it repealed it, one’s confidence in both the legislature and the courts can only be
shaken.451 The Pennsylvania pattern precipitates this kind of jurisprudence by its dependence on
oxymoron, metaphor, misnomer, and ambiguity.
A. The Legislative Response
The Premeditation Criterion: Arguments for Legislative Repeal. In some jurisdictions
(particularly California), the jurisprudence of homicide seems like a contraption held together by
duct tape and bailing wire. The separation of two degrees of murder by the concept of
450
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premeditation, for example, puts the courts to a difficult challenge.452 To make sense of this
standard in practice, the courts inevitably find themselves forced to explain to juries that no time
interval should be required for premeditation. Otherwise, some of the worst kinds of murders,
those that are bizarre, senseless, and brutal, will merit acquittal of first-degree murder precisely
because they are bizarre, senseless, and brutal. Hence, the Pennsylvania pattern pushes courts
toward a concept of “instant premeditation,” or premeditation not requiring any mental focus
prior to the crime itself. This concept seems to conflict with the requirement of premeditation,
which implies, at the very least, a need for some kind of prior mental focus.
Furthermore, a concept of instant premeditation undercuts the legislative distinction
between the two degrees of murder. Premeditation becomes synonymous with intent, which
arguably should be insufficient for first-degree murder, since intent theoretically supplies only
malice, which in turn is a requirement for both first and second degree murder. In response to
this anomaly, some courts have attempted to create a jurisprudence of premeditation that
distinguishes it sharply from intent. Thus, the California court’s decision in Anderson, which set
out judicially invented “factors” by which to judge premeditation, was an understandable, if
badly misguided, effort to honor the legislative intent. Unfortunately, the court thus forced
premeditation into a Procrustean bed, such that the definition meant that some of the most
aggravated murders required acquittal of first degree. It also distorted the legislative intent.
The ostensible solution to this dilemma is to paper over the problem. The courts can keep
ill-fitting decisions in place but announce that they have the status only of guidelines, and they
can instruct juries on premeditation in ways that undercut it by equating it, in effect, to intent.

451

See supra note 356 and accompanying text.

452

See supra notes 135-41 and accompanying text.

116

This is the result that California unfortunately has reached with decisions such as Perez,453 and in
fact it is a result shared at least to some degree, with variations, in other jurisdictions. The trouble
is, this approach muddles the standard. It requires litigation of the first-degree issue up and down
the appellate ladder in virtually every case. It wastes millions of dollars’ worth of scarce criminal
justice resources that could be dedicated instead to better policing, victim-witness services, or
improvement of prison conditions. It detracts from the coherent presentation of other appellate
issues that might be more meritorious. At the trial level, it results in instructions that create a
confusing non-standard. California has pretended that this confusion is not a problem by labeling
it, euphemistically, as jury “discretion.” Instead, the result is lawlessness. Juries can reach results
only by applying their own philosophies of crime seriousness, producing disparity and
arbitrariness. In doing so, they are free to hinge their decisions on invidious criteria.
Degrees of Murder: The Case for Abolition. If this condition were the result of a
necessary concept, one that furthered sound policies of criminal justice, it might be tolerable. But
the premeditation standard is not necessary; it is not even helpful. Both ancient and modern
critics have explained persuasively why premeditation is a dysfunctional method of separating
the most serious homicides from lesser ones. The drafters of the Model Penal Code concluded
that beyond a requirement of knowledge or intent, “no further grading distinctions . . . can
usefully be made . . . .”454 A focus upon premeditation simply produces bad crime grading. This
critique is not new. The great historian James Fitzjames Stephen expressed it in similar terms
almost 150 years ago, and commentators in the 2000’s have done the same.455 The message is a
simple one: the Pennsylvania pattern has outlived its usefulness, and it should be scrapped.
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Attempts to divide the crime of murder into pigeonholes outstrip our ability to use words
of sufficient precision to achieve the goal. Justice Cardozo doubted the ability of juries to apply
the fine standard implicit in the idea of premeditation.456 One might modify that message to say,
with less lawyer-oriented egocentrism, that lawgivers cannot compress all of the relevant factors
into a premeditation standard that will enable juries to separate murder rationally into degrees.
The ancient function of the Pennsylvania pattern, to confine the death penalty, is now
accomplished by separate definitions and factors adapted more directly to that goal.457 A single
degree of murder is preferable, and the legislatures should enact this change.
Malice Aforethought: An Unnecessary Distractant. At the same time, the Pennsylvania
pattern depends upon the multivariate concept of “malice aforethought.”458 The double misnomer
that these words convey produces confusion at best and arbitrariness at worst. Jurors in homicide
cases often must navigate through instructions containing multiple concepts of murder, multiple
lesser included offenses, and multiple defenses, each depending on multiple elements. The result
is that they must apply literally dozens of technical but similar-sounding legalisms. The
cumulative confusion unnecessarily added by the superfluous term, “malice aforethought,” can
only furnish a distraction. The misnomer inherent in this language can be addressed by firm
direction to the jury to ignore these words because they do not mean what they say, but the juryeducation effort that goes into this non-issue is lost to other important concepts that the jury
should master. People can absorb only so many twists and turns in a finite time. Besides, a
charge that requires the jury to ignore words given by the judge, because they are meaningless,
seems unwise in the extreme; one might well fear that this approach would create disrespect for
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other parts of the charge. Jurors may wonder, “Is the definition of intent similarly meaningless,
or is the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt something to be ignored too?,” if they are
told that solemn terms such as malice aforethought are devoid of significance.
Again, this effect would be tolerable if the malice terminology were useful. But it is only
a historical appendage, an atavistic relic. The jury necessarily must be instructed separately about
the meaning of express malice, or intent, and implied malice, or depraved-heart murder. Malice
adds nothing to those instructions. It can be removed from the judge’s charge without any loss of
meaning. The charge would be improved if the legislature were to mandate this result and to tell
the courts to instruct solely on intent and depraved-heart murder.
Depraved-Heart Murder: A Dysfunctional Concept and a Gap in Crime Definition.
But another difficulty with the malice standard is that it includes the depraved-heart variety of
the crime. Adjudication by metaphor is a bad idea. A metaphor is a species of analogy, and thus
it is inferior to definition when precision is important.459 In fact, metaphor is a literary device,
one that achieves fuzzy truths precisely by confusing disparate concepts. The depraved-heart
formula enables the jury to set its own standard by guessing just how depraved is “depraved,”
and thus it inevitably must create disparity and arbitrariness. It invites jurors to consider what
they do not like about the defendant in ways extrinsic to any crime definition and then to use that
pure dislike to return a verdict of murder. It even invites the use of invidious criteria. The best
solution to this problem is legislative: to repeal the depraved-heart formula and to substitute for it
a standard with greater precision, such as subjective awareness of a high degree of risk or
conscious indifference, coupled with causally dangerous behavior. Better yet, the legislature
could follow the Model Penal Code by reserving the label of murder for intentional and knowing
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killings, with certain supplementary provisions, and by placing the lesser label of manslaughter,
instead of murder, upon reckless but unintended killings with subjective awareness of risk.460
The inclusion of depraved-heart killings in the category of murder means that the
Pennsylvania pattern creates another kind of anomaly. The result of placing reckless killings
(those that are unintentional but committed with subjective awareness of risk) into the category
of murder, and creating a lesser included offense that drops the standard all the way down to
criminal negligence, is that a gap appears in the hierarchy of offenses, and the levels of homicide
cease to correspond to levels of blameworthiness. Crimes that are not comparable to murders, but
that are more serious than negligent homicides, are assigned to no category reflecting their
seriousness.
The dog-mauling cases in California are examples. Some of these cases unmistakably
exhibit mentes reae more serious than mere negligence. When actors consciously expose
innocent bystanders to animals bred to kill, with awareness of the risk they create and with
indifference to it, their subjective mental states are more culpable than negligence. Their crime is
not the minor version of homicide corresponding to that lesser mens rea. Therefore, one can
expect competent prosecutors, who seek to obtain justice in such cases, to attempt to categorize
these crimes as murders, especially since they fit the depraved-heart metaphor and supply the
subjective awareness component that usually is given as a companion instruction in seconddegree murder cases. But the crime of murder seems ill-fitting to address conduct of this kind.
These kinds of offenses fit neither the negligence standard nor the label of murder, no matter
which of these categories is ultimately chosen, the judgment will represent a stretch. There
should be a separate crime of manslaughter that covers a mental state between that of intent and
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knowledge at the high end and that of negligence at the low end. This result, however, can be
achieved only by legislation. The Model Penal Code shows one way to do it.461
Voluntary Manslaughter: Legislation That Retains the Common Law. There is one
place, however, where the ancient standards that usually accompany the Pennsylvania pattern are
superior to modern conceptions such as the Model Penal Code. Voluntary manslaughter in the
MPC depends upon a mental state of “extreme mental or emotional disturbance” for which there
is a “reasonable explanation or excuse.”462 This standard might exonerate, say, a political
terrorist from a conviction for mass murder, if the terrorist were to act from deviant versions of
religious beliefs that are a “reasonable explanation” of the actor’s emotional disturbance. The
MPC’s definition is too diffuse: it is both vague in application and excessively broad in
coverage. Many Pennsylvania-pattern States, including California, have avoided this result by
retaining the historical formulation of voluntary manslaughter, which in this instance is a better
fit.
The common law tradition reduces the grade of a passion offense in a way that is
confined to the policy of recognizing human frailty. It is a doctrine of forgiveness that is
deontological463 in nature, rather than utilitarian; it interferes, in fact, with the utilitarian
foundations of sentencing and should be confined to instances in which it is needed for fair crime
grading. The common law achieves this result by confining the lesser offense to sudden passion
that arises from an adequate cause, measured objectively, close in time to the homicide, and
precipitated by the victim. A few States, unfortunately, have instead adopted the MPC approach.
The common law approach, which can be either codified or preserved by decision, is preferable.
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It is arguable that improvements could be achieved by retaining the murder label and adjusting
only the sentence and by defining the conditions for the reduction as an affirmative defense so
that the burden of proof is placed upon the defendant. These issues are less important, however,
and more debatable than the fundamental definition of the concept.
Felony Murder: Legislative Revision. Most States have preserved the felony murder
doctrine, possibly because of the policies that it arguably serves. At the same time, the doctrine
can result in crime definition that deviates unacceptably from blameworthiness if it is
insufficiently limited, and the arguments of the critics thus are also important in defining its
contours. This article takes no position on the question whether the doctrine should be preserved,
but assumes from current conditions that most jurisdictions will choose to retain it. The
remaining question, then, concerns the definition of felony murder. How can it best be described
so that it carries out its arguable functions, while minimizing the degree to which some of its
applications might detract from the connection between crime and blameworthiness?
First, freeing felony murder from the common law of malice is desirable for the same
reasons that it is desirable in other cases.464 The jury should not be told that “implied malice”
arises from felony murder conditions; instead, it should be instructed more straightforwardly: to
convict the defendant of murder if the conditions are proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and to
acquit if not. Second, the “inherently dangerous felony” doctrine is unworkable and should be
replaced, in those States that use it, by legislation requiring “an act clearly dangerous to human
life” or the equivalent. The dangerous felony approach results in classifications devoid of
rationality and conflicting with each other.465 It invites nonsensical translations, such as
California’s “high probability of death” standard, which few felonies would meet even among
464
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those that concededly are “dangerous.” The dangerous act approach, on the other hand, serves
such arguable policies as consistent crime grading, upholding the sanctity of life, deterring
dangerous acts, and simplifying crime definition. At the same time, since it depends upon the
conduct of the individual defendant, the dangerous act formula avoids disconnecting individual
culpability from assignment of guilt, and thus it addresses the most consistent issue raised by
felony-murder critics.
A third issue raised by the common law of felony murder is the merger doctrine. States
that define felony murder by statute and that confine merger to manslaughter raise difficult issues
of crime grading by allowing negligently committed felonies to serve as predicates for murder
convictions. To some extent, this difficulty is mitigated by the requirement of an act clearly
dangerous to human life, which imposes a requirement that confines felony murder in a
relatively consistent way.466 Also, by construction, courts can extend merger to lesser included
offenses within manslaughter, such as negligent homicide. A more difficult question is created
by felony murder that is predicated on criminally negligent child injury or on aggravated assault.
Texas allows both of these predicates, while California allows neither. Textual and policy
arguments support Texas’s approach, but the arguments of critics against felony murder support
California’s approach since they seem most applicable to murder convictions predicated on
crimes of criminal negligence. At the same time, California’s application of merger to assault,
without the provision of a serious-bodily-injury means of committing murder, is inconsistent
with the common law that California purports to apply, and its extension of the prohibition to
assaultive burglaries is inconsistent with the goal of maximizing the achievement of underlying
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policies as well as contrary to the majority rule.467
The Case for Comprehensive Legislative Redefinition. Legislation to correct these
anomalies under the Pennsylvania pattern is highly desirable. They result in both vagueness and
poor definition of homicidal crimes. Sound legislation would abolish degrees of murder and the
premeditation-deliberation formula. It would abolish the antiquated and dysfunctional symbol of
malice aforethought, together with the depraved-heart variety of murder that it implies. In place
of these concepts, it would define murder by intent or knowledge. Sound legislation would also
include a type of murder based on serious assaults, those intended to produce serious bodily
injury, defined as lasting loss of a body feature. A good statute also would recognize passion
circumstances in a provision confined by legislatively codified common law restrictions, either
in the form of a separate crime of voluntary manslaughter or as a sentence-range reduction.
For homicides not involving intent or passion, sound legislation would create an
intermediate lesser-included crime of involuntary manslaughter, characterized by conscious
indifference to life: a crime committed with actual awareness of a major risk of death. It might
also create a lesser crime of negligent homicide, requiring criminal negligence and depending
upon a gross deviation from ordinary conduct, but capable of being supplied by highly
inexcusable inadvertence. Finally, if the jurisdiction retains the felony-murder rule, its legislature
should replace the “inherently dangerous felony” doctrine with a requirement of “an act clearly
dangerous to human life.” It should carefully consider and describe which felonies are to be
excluded by merger from serving as predicates. Lesser-included offenses are the first candidates
for this merger list. The merged offenses also can sensibly include assault as a prohibited
predicate if murder is separately defined to include killings with intent to cause serious bodily
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injury. And arguably, crimes committed only by negligence should be excluded, although child
injury resulting in death poses a set of policy considerations that might merit its exception from
the exclusion.
B. Adjudication: Without Legislation, How Can the Courts Improve Their Jurisprudence?
Premeditation: Making Sense of Its Incoherence. In the meantime, some issues can be
dealt with by judicial evolution. For example, until the legislature is persuaded to act, courts
adjudicating the Pennsylvania pattern should forthrightly recognize that complete rationality
cannot be achieved together with fidelity to the legislation. As California has demonstrated,
efforts to protect the distinction between intent and premeditation by judicially invented factors
lead to irrational results. A better solution is to rely on the terms “premeditation” and
“deliberation” themselves; to tell juries that no time requirement is implied; to avoid complex
attempts to translate these terms into other terminology that is not contained in the statutes; and
to tolerate the apparent oxymoron created by the possibility of instantaneous premeditation, as
well as the difficulty of distinguishing intent.468 This approach may well be the one that
California finally has chosen to follow. If so, however, California should make a clean break
from the mistake it made in People v. Anderson by overruling that decision.
Malice Aforethought: Conceptual Definition, without Misnomer.

Simultaneously,

courts subject to the Pennsylvania pattern could dispense with the inclusion in jury instructions
of the misleading symbol created by the phrase, “malice aforethought.” Legislation here should
not be necessary because the function of jury instructions is to enable jurors to apply the law
consistently to the facts they find.
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aforethought,” and they interfere with jurors’ understanding of the mens rea for murder.469
Worse yet, they endanger acceptance of the rest of the charge by implicitly suggesting that the
judge’s instructions contain terms that are to be ignored. Full conveyance of the meaning of
malice aforethought can be achieved by a charge that tells the jury about intent as one possible
mens rea for murder, together with other modalities for supplying the mens rea if they are
applicable. Nothing is lost by this approach, and the double misnomer contained in the ancient
phrase “malice aforethought” then no longer would create confusion.
Depraved-Heart Malice: Abandoning the Metaphor. The branch of malice
encompassing the depraved heart formula is more difficult to deal with in the absence of
legislation, but it merits the same basic judicial treatment. Courts subject to the Pennsylvania
pattern, with its archaic element of malice, are required as a matter of fidelity to legislative
language to honor the kind of murder that the depraved-heart metaphor creates. But as with
malice, there is no good reason to continue to use the precise language, “depraved heart,” or
“abandoned and malignant heart.”470 Usually, when jury instructions are given, the depravedheart terminology is accompanied by more precise language requiring an element such as
extreme recklessness, which in turn is made out by a subjective, actual awareness of a high risk
of death, or a conscious indifference to that risk, combined with conduct that causally produces a
homicide. Jury instructions based on these concepts would preserve the meaning of depravedheart murder without inviting the potential abuses that could follow from jury concentration on
the depraved-heart terminology.
There is little that the courts can do, however, to remedy the legislatively created
anomaly that results when depraved heart murder either overlaps with a kind of manslaughter
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that also is defined by recklessness, or when there is no intermediate crime between murder and
homicides committed by mere negligence. Legislation is probably required in these
circumstances to create a hierarchy of crimes that corresponds better to grades of seriousness.471
The courts can, however, make sure that the rules are clear. In California, where both of these
disadvantages are inherent in the jurisprudence—that is, where there is a gap between murder
and a lesser crime defined by criminal negligence, and there also is overlap, because the term
“recklessness” is confusingly applied to both—the California court could improve both the
proportionality and the clarity of these crimes by clearly holding that subjective awareness of
risk is required for the greater offense while gross negligence in the form of highly inexcusable
inadvertence suffices for the lesser.
Felony Murder: Preserving Both Its Purposes and Its Connection to Blameworthiness.
Courts that still use the dangerous felony approach to felony murder should overrule it. This is a
court-created doctrine, one that furnishes an adjunct to a court-created type of murder.472 Its
abolition would meet even stringent standards for departure from stare decisis, since it has
proved transparently unworkable.473 In its place, these courts could adopt the dangerous act
approach instead. This replacement test would focus upon the conduct of the individual
defendant in the particular case, requiring that this conduct include “an act clearly dangerous to
human life,” instead of isolating the formal elements of the felony “in the abstract.” Other courts
have adopted this kind of test as a matter of common law evolution. It is capable of more
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consistent results than the dangerous felony approach, and it carries out the policies that arguably
support the felony murder rule with less violation of the concern for disconnection between
culpability and conviction that critics of the rule raise.
The Incompleteness of Judicial Solutions. But legislation reforming homicide laws
from top to bottom is a better path for States subject to the Pennsylvania pattern. The tug of stare
decisis, as well as the terms of the existing legislation, will prevent courts from rationalizing
many of the most serious disadvantages. To return to an observation that appeared near the
beginning of this article, Texas revised its homicide laws in 1973 as part of a comprehensive
reform based on the Model Penal Code.474 The result was neither easy nor cost-free. But today,
the people of my State have homicide laws that mean what they say, reflect the people’s values,
and correspond to degrees of blameworthiness. States that struggle to do justice under the
strictures of the Pennsylvania pattern should do the same.
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